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Halbig v. Burwell 
 
Ruling Below: Halbig v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 129023 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 
Individuals and employers in states that had declined to establish health benefit exchanges under 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) brought action challenging Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) rule authorizing tax credits for insurance purchased on both state-run and 
federally-facilitated exchanges. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
entered summary judgment in government's favor, and plaintiffs appealed. 
 
Question Presented: Whether the ACA unambiguously restricts the section 36B subsidy to 
insurance purchased on Exchanges established by the State as opposed to those established by 
the Federal government. 
 
 
Jacqueline HALBIG, et al., Appellants 
v. 
Sylvia Mathews BURWELL, In her Official Capacity as U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, et al., Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on July 22, 2014 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: 
 Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, 
enacted as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act), 
makes tax credits available as a form of 
subsidy to individuals who purchase health 
insurance through marketplaces—known as 
“American Health Benefit Exchanges,” or 
“Exchanges” for short—that are “established 
by the State under section 1311” of the Act. 
On its face, this provision authorizes tax 
credits for insurance purchased on an 
Exchange established by one of the fifty 
states or the District of Columbia. But the 
Internal Revenue Service has 
interpreted section 36B broadly to authorize 
the subsidy also for insurance purchased on 
an Exchange established by the federal 
government under section 1321 of the Act. 
(hereinafter “IRS Rule”). 
Appellants are a group of individuals and 
employers residing in states that did not 
establish Exchanges. For reasons we explain 
more fully below, the IRS's interpretation of 
section 36B makes them subject to certain 
penalties under the ACA that they would 
rather not face. Believing that the IRS's 
interpretation is inconsistent with section 
36B, appellants challenge the regulation 
under the Administrative Procedure Act 




On cross-motions for summary judgment, 
the district court rejected that challenge, 
granting the government's motion and 
denying appellants'. After resolving several 
threshold issues related to its jurisdiction, 
the district court held that the ACA's text, 
structure, purpose, and legislative history 
make “clear that Congress intended to make 
premium tax credits available on both state-
run and federally-facilitated Exchanges.” 
Furthermore, the court held that even if the 
ACA were ambiguous, the IRS's regulation 
would represent a permissible construction 
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. 
Appellants timely appealed the district 
court's orders, and we have jurisdiction. Our 
review of the orders is de novo, and “[o]n an 
independent review of the record, we will 
uphold an agency action unless we find it to 
be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.’ ” Because we conclude that the 
ACA unambiguously restricts the section 
36B subsidy to insurance purchased on 
Exchanges “established by the State,” we 
reverse the district court and vacate the 
IRS's regulation. 
I 
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act in 2010 “to increase the 
number of Americans covered by health 
insurance and decrease the cost of health 
care.” The ACA pursues these goals through 
a complex network of interconnected 
policies focused primarily on helping 
individuals who do not receive coverage 
through an employer or government 
program to purchase affordable insurance 
directly. Central to this effort are the 
Exchanges. Exchanges are “governmental 
agenc[ies] or nonprofit entit[ies]” that serve 
as both gatekeepers and gateways to health 
insurance coverage. Among their many 
functions as gatekeepers, Exchanges 
determine which health plans satisfy federal 
and state standards, and they operate 
websites that allow individuals and 
employers to enroll in those that do. Section 
1311 of the ACA delegates primary 
responsibility for establishing Exchanges to 
individual states. However, because 
Congress cannot require states to implement 
federal laws, if a state refuses or is unable to 
set up an Exchange, section 1321 provides 
that the federal government, through the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), “shall ... establish and operate such 
Exchange within the State.” As of today, 
only fourteen states and the District of 
Columbia have established Exchanges. The 
federal government has established 
Exchanges in the remaining thirty-six states, 
in some cases with state assistance but in 
most cases not.  
Under section 36B, Exchanges also serve as 
the gateway to the refundable tax credits 
through which the ACA subsidizes health 
insurance. Generally speaking, section 
36B authorizes credits for “applicable 
taxpayer[s],” defined as those with 
household incomes between 100 and 400 
percent of the federal poverty line. 
But section 36B's formula for calculating the 
credit works further limits on who may 
receive the subsidy. According to that 
formula, the credit is to equal the sum of the 
“premium assistance amounts” for each 
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“coverage month.” The “premium assistance 
amount” is based on the cost of a “qualified 
health plan ... enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under 
[section] 1311 of the [ACA].”  … In other 
words, the tax credit is available only to 
subsidize the purchase of insurance on an 
“Exchange established by the State under 
section 1311 of the [ACA].” 
But, in a regulation promulgated on May 23, 
2012, the IRS interpreted section 36B to 
allow credits for insurance purchased on 
either a state- or federally-established 
Exchange. Specifically, the regulation 
provided that a taxpayer may receive a tax 
credit if he “is enrolled in one or more 
qualified health plans through an 
Exchange,” which the IRS defined as “an 
Exchange serving the individual market for 
qualified individuals ..., regardless of 
whether the Exchange is established and 
operated by a State (including a regional 
Exchange or subsidiary Exchange) or by 
HHS. In promulgating this broader rule, the 
IRS acknowledged that “[c]ommentators 
disagreed on whether the language in section 
36B(b)(2)(A) limits the availability of the 
premium tax credit only to taxpayers who 
enroll in qualified health plans on State 
Exchanges,” but asserted without 
elaboration that “[t]he statutory language of 
section 36B and other provisions of the 
[ACA],” as well as “the relevant legislative 
history,” supported its view. 
This broader interpretation has major 
ramifications. By making credits more 
widely available, the IRS Rule gives the 
individual and employer mandates—key 
provisions of the ACA—broader effect than 
they would have if credits were limited to 
state-established Exchanges. The individual 
mandate requires individuals to maintain 
“minimum essential coverage” and, in 
general, enforces that requirement with a 
penalty. The penalty does not apply, 
however, to individuals for whom the annual 
cost of the cheapest available coverage, less 
any tax credits, would exceed eight percent 
of their projected household income. By 
some estimates, credits will determine on 
which side of the eight-percent threshold 
millions of individuals fall. Thus, by making 
tax credits available in the 36 states with 
federal Exchanges, the IRS Rule 
significantly increases the number of people 
who must purchase health insurance or face 
a penalty. 
The IRS Rule affects the employer mandate 
in a similar way. Like the individual 
mandate, the employer mandate uses the 
threat of penalties to induce large 
employers—defined as those with at least 50 
employees—to provide their full-time 
employees with health insurance. 
Specifically, the ACA penalizes any large 
employer who fails to offer its full-time 
employees suitable coverage if one or more 
of those employees “enroll[s] ... in a 
qualified health plan with respect to which 
an applicable tax credit ... is allowed or paid 
with respect to the employee.” Thus, even 
more than with the individual mandate, the 
employer mandate's penalties hinge on the 
availability of credits. If credits were 
unavailable in states with federal Exchanges, 
employers there would face no penalties for 
failing to offer coverage. The IRS Rule has 
the opposite effect: by allowing credits in 
such states, it exposes employers there to 
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penalties and thereby gives the employer 
mandate broader reach. 
II 
Before we can turn to the merits of the 
parties' dispute, we must first address the 
government's argument that all appellants 
lack standing and that, even if they have 
standing, the APA does not provide them 
with a cause of action to challenge the IRS 
Rule. Because we find that appellant David 
Klemencic has standing and a cause of 
action under the APA, we do not reach the 
issue of our jurisdiction over the remaining 
appellants' claims.  
A 
The “ ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ 
“ a plaintiff must show to establish standing 
is (1) an injury in fact (2) fairly traceable to 
the alleged conduct of the defendant (3) that 
is likely to be redressed by the relief the 
plaintiff seeks.” The district court 
determined that at least one of the 
appellants, David Klemencic, has standing. 
Klemencic resides in West Virginia, a state 
that did not establish its own Exchange, and 
expects to earn approximately $20,000 this 
year. He avers that he does not wish to 
purchase health insurance and that, but for 
federal credits, he would be exempt from the 
individual mandate because the 
unsubsidized cost of coverage would exceed 
eight percent of his income. The availability 
of credits on West Virginia's federal 
Exchange therefore confronts Klemencic 
with a choice he'd rather avoid: purchase 
health insurance at a subsidized cost of less 
than $21 per year or pay a somewhat greater 
tax penalty. 
The government primarily questions 
whether Klemencic has suffered an injury in 
fact… The government characterizes 
Klemencic's injury as purely ideological and 
hence neither concrete nor particularized. 
But, although Klemencic admits to being at 
least partly motivated by opposition to 
“government handouts,” he has established 
that, by making subsidies available in West 
Virginia, the IRS Rule will have quantifiable 
economic consequences particular to him. 
Those consequences may be small, but even 
an “ ‘identifiable trifle’ “ of harm may 
establish standing. Klemencic thus satisfies 
the requirement of establishing an injury in 
fact, and because that injury is traceable to 
the IRS Rule and redressable through a 
judicial decision invalidating the rule, we 
find that he has standing to challenge the 
rule. We therefore proceed to consider 
whether Klemencic may mount his 
challenge under the APA. 
B 
The APA provides a cause of action to 
challenge final agency action “for which 
there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court.” The government argues that even if 
Klemencic has standing to challenge the IRS 
Rule, he cannot do so under the APA 
because he has an adequate alternative 
remedy in the form of a tax-refund suit: 
Klemencic could violate the individual 
mandate, pay the penalty, and then sue for a 
refund, raising the same arguments he 
makes here. Such a remedy is adequate, the 
government contends, because if Klemencic 




The APA “embodies the basic presumption 
of judicial review” of agency action. 
Therefore, in determining whether an 
alternative remedy is adequate, we must 
give the APA's “generous review 
provisions” a “hospitable interpretation,” 
such that “only upon a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence of a contrary legislative 
intent should the courts restrict access to 
judicial review.” Under this standard, “[a]n 
alternative remedy will not be adequate ... if 
the remedy offers only ‘doubtful and limited 
relief’ ” Although “the alternative remedy 
need not provide relief identical to relief 
under the APA,” it must “offer[ ] relief of 
the ‘same genre.’ ” 
In arguing that a tax refund suit provides an 
adequate alternative remedy, the 
government emphasizes Klemencic's ability 
to recover any assessed overpayment, plus 
interest. But that backward-looking relief 
differs in kind from the prospective relief 
Klemencic could obtain under the APA. 
Specifically, requiring Klemencic to proceed 
via refund suit would deprive him of the 
opportunity to obtain a “certificate of 
exemption.” Such certificates are a form of 
safe harbor, allowing an individual to obtain 
an exemption from the mandate's penalty on 
the basis of projected income, 
“notwithstanding any [subsequent] change 
in an individual's circumstances.” Unlike the 
“prospective[ ]” assurance such certificates 
offer, a refund suit would require Klemencic 
to violate the law as it now stands, pay a 
penalty, and only then challenge the 
assessment of the penalty for that previous 
year based on his actual income. And even if 
Klemencic were to prevail, his relief-
financial restitution would be backwards 
looking, meaning that Klemencic would 
have to repeat the cycle the following year. 
The government offers no suggestion that he 
could obtain a certificate of exemption 
through a refund action. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that Klemencic 
could obtain any prospective relief through a 
refund action, let alone that which he seeks 
under his APA claim—namely, a declaration 
that the IRS Rule is invalid and an 
injunction barring its implementation. As we 
explained in Cohen v. United States, the 
provision authorizing refund suits “does not, 
at least explicitly, allow for prospective 
relief.” … We must therefore conclude that 
a tax refund suit is inadequate as an 
alternative remedy: it is “doubtful” that it 
offers prospective relief at all, and the 
monetary relief it does offer is clearly not 
“of the same genre” as the relief available to 
appellants under the APA. Because a tax 
refund suit thus offers Klemencic only 
“doubtful and limited relief,” we hold that 
the APA provides him with a cause of action 
to challenge the IRS Rule and turn to the 
merits of his claim. 
III 
On the merits, this case requires us to 
determine whether the ACA permits the IRS 
to provide tax credits for insurance 
purchased through federal Exchanges. To 
make this determination, we begin by asking 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue,” for if it has, 
we must give effect to its unambiguously 
expressed intent. The text of section 36B is 
only the starting point of this analysis. That 
provision is but one piece of a vast, complex 
statutory scheme, and we must consider it 
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both on its own and in relation to the ACA's 
interconnected provisions and overall 
structure so as to interpret the Act, if 
possible, “as a symmetrical and coherent 
scheme.” 
Although both appellants and the 
government argue that the ACA, read in its 
totality, evinces clear congressional intent, 
they dispute what that intent actually is. 
Appellants argue that if taxpayers can 
receive credits only for plans enrolled in 
“through an Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” 
then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to 
taxpayers who purchased insurance on an 
Exchange established by the federal 
government. After all, the federal 
government is not a “State,” and its 
authority to establish Exchanges appears in 
section 1321 rather than section 1311. The 
government counters that appellants take a 
blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 
1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete 
equivalence between state and federal 
Exchanges, such that when the federal 
government establishes an Exchange, it does 
so standing in the state's shoes. Furthermore, 
the government argues, whereas appellants' 
construction of section 36B renders other 
provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view 
brings coherence to the statute and better 
promotes the purpose of the Act. 
We conclude that appellants have the better 
of the argument: a federal Exchange is not 
an “Exchange established by the State,” 
and section 36B does not authorize the IRS 
to provide tax credits for insurance 
purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach 
this conclusion by the following path: First, 
we examine section 36B in light of sections 
1311 and 1321, which authorize the 
establishment of state and federal 
Exchanges, respectively, and conclude 
that section 36B plainly distinguishes 
Exchanges established by states from those 
established by the federal government. We 
then consider the government's arguments 
that this construction generates absurd 
results but find that it does not render other 
provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone 
so unreasonable as to justify 
disregarding section 36B's plain meaning. 
Finally, turning to the ACA's purpose and 
legislative history, we find that the 
government again comes up short in its 
efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its 
appeals to the ACA's broad aims do not 
demonstrate that Congress manifestly meant 
something other than what section 36B says. 
A 
The crux of this case is whether an 
Exchange established by the federal 
government is an “Exchange established by 
the State under section 1311 of the [ACA].” 
We therefore begin with the provisions 
authorizing states and the federal 
government to establish Exchanges. Section 
1311 provides that states “shall” establish 
Exchanges. But, as the parties agree, despite 
its seemingly mandatory language, section 
1311 more cajoles than commands. A state 
is not literally required to establish an 
Exchange; the ACA merely encourages it to 
do so. And if a state elects not to (or is 
unable to), such that it “will not have any 
required Exchange operational by January 1, 
2014,” section 1321 directs the federal 
government, through the Secretary of Health 
8 
 
and Human Services, to “establish and 
operate such Exchange within the State.”  
The phrase “such Exchange” has twofold 
significance. First, the word “such”—
meaning “aforementioned,”—signifies that 
the Exchange the Secretary must establish is 
the “required Exchange” that the state failed 
to establish. In other words, “such” conveys 
what a federal Exchange is: the equivalent 
of the Exchange a state would have 
established had it elected to do so. The 
meaning of “Exchange” in the ACA 
reinforces and builds on this sense. The 
ACA defines an “Exchange” as “an 
American Health Benefit Exchange 
established under [section 1311 of the 
ACA].” If we import that definition into the 
text of section 1321, the provision directs 
the Secretary to “establish ... such American 
Health Benefit Exchange established under 
[section 1311 of the ACA] within the State.” 
This suggests not only that the Secretary is 
to establish the type of exchange described 
in section 1311, but also that when she does 
so, she acts under section 1311, even though 
her authority appears in section 1321. Thus, 
section 1321 creates equivalence between 
state and federal Exchanges in two respects: 
in terms of what they are and the statutory 
authority under which they are established. 
The problem confronting the IRS Rule is 
that subsidies also turn on a third attribute of 
Exchanges: who established them. 
Under section 36B, subsidies are available 
only for plans “enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State under 
section 1311 of the [ACA].” Of the three 
elements of that provision—(1) an Exchange 
(2) established by the State (3) under section 
1311—federal Exchanges satisfy only two: 
they are Exchanges established under 
section 1311. Nothing in section 1321 
deems federally-established Exchanges to be 
“Exchange[s] established by the State.” This 
omission is particularly significant since 
Congress knew how to provide that a non-
state entity should be treated as if it were a 
state when it sets up an Exchange. In a 
nearby section, the ACA provides that a 
U.S. territory that “elects ... to establish an 
Exchange ... shall be treated as a State .” 
The absence of similar language in section 
1321 suggests that even though the federal 
government may establish an Exchange 
“within the State,” it does not in fact stand in 
the state's shoes when doing so.  
The dissent attempts to supply this missing 
equivalency by pointing to section 
1311(d)(1), which provides: “An Exchange 
shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit 
entity that is established by a State.” 
According to the dissent, (d)(1) means that 
an Exchange established under section 1311 
is, by definition, established by a state. 
Therefore, the dissent argues, because 
federal Exchanges are established under 
section 1311, they too, by definition, are 
established by a state. 
The premise that (d)(1) is definitional, 
however, does not survive examination of 
(d)(l)'s context and the ACA's structure. The 
other provisions of section 1311(d) are 
operational requirements, setting forth what 
Exchanges must (or, in some cases, may) do. 
Read in keeping with that theme, (d)(1) 
would simply require that an Exchange 
operate as either a governmental agency or 
nonprofit entity. But the dissent would have 
9 
 
us construe (d)(1) differently. In its view, 
(d)(1) plays a definitional role unique among 
section 1311(d)'s otherwise operational 
provisions, creating a legal fiction that any 
Exchange is, by definition, established by a 
state, even when, as a matter of fact, it is 
not. That reading, however, would render 
(d)(1) the odd man out twice over: both 
within section 1311(d) and among the 
ACA's other definitional provisions, which, 
unlike (d)(1), employ the (unmistakably 
definitional) formula of “The term ‘X’ 
means....” 
The dissent's reading would also require us 
to overlook the fact that section 1311(d) 
would be a strange place for Congress to 
have buried such a legal fiction. Section 
1311, after all, concerns Exchanges that are 
established by states in fact; the legal fiction 
the dissent urges would matter only to 
Exchanges established by the federal 
government. To accept the dissent's 
construction would therefore transform 
(d)(1) into the proverbial elephant in the 
mousehole—the “ancillary provision[ ]” 
that “alter[s] the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme.” The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that Congress does not 
legislate in this manner, and we see no 
evidence that it did so here.
 
Indeed, we are 
particularly loath to accept the dissent's 
construction given that there are far more 
natural locations to place this fiction, such as 
section 1321 or the provision defining the 
term “Exchange.” 
The dissent's construction of (d)(1) also 
ignores the structural relationship between 
sections 1311 and 1321. Just as section 
1311(b)(1) assumes that states will establish 
Exchanges in general, section 
1311(d) assumes that states will carry out 
the specific requirements Exchanges must 
meet. But if those assumptions prove wrong, 
section 1321 assigns the federal government 
responsibility both to establish the Exchange 
and to ensure that it satisfies the particulars 
of section 1311(d). In other words, section 
1321 creates a limited scheme of 
substitution: the requirements assigned to 
states by 1311(d) are transferred to the 
federal government if a state fails to 
establish an Exchange. The specific 
requirement that (d)(1) assumes each state 
will fulfill is to establish an Exchange in the 
form of “a governmental agency or 
nonprofit entity.” So if a state elects not to 
participate in the creation of an Exchange, 
section 1321 directs the federal government 
that it must create “a governmental agency 
or nonprofit entity” to serve as the 
Exchange. Crucially, this construction does 
not entail ignoring the plain meaning of 
“established by a State” in section 
1311(d)(1); here, section 1321 tells us to 
substitute the federal government for the 
state under a certain scenario. But there is 
nothing comparable with respect to section 
36B: no analogue to section 1321 says 
that section 36B should be read to 
encompass federally-established Exchanges. 
Accordingly, we reject the dissent's 
argument that, because federal Exchanges 
are established under section 1311, they are 
by definition “established by a State.” 
Instead, sections 1311 and 1321 lead us to 
interpret section 36B essentially as 
appellants do. Those provisions, to be sure, 
establish some degree of equivalence 
between state and federal Exchanges—
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enough, indeed, that if section 36B had 
authorized credits for insurance purchased 
on an “Exchange established under section 
1311,” the IRS Rule would stand. 
But section 36B actually authorizes credits 
only for coverage purchased on an 
“Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311,” and  the 
government offers no textual basis—
in sections 1311 and 1321 or elsewhere—for 
concluding that a federally—established 
Exchange is, in fact or legal fiction, 
established by a state. Moreover, as we have 
noted, that absence is especially glaring 
given that the ACA elsewhere provides that 
a federal territory that establishes an 
Exchange “shall be treated as a State,” 
clearly demonstrating that Congress knew 
how to deem a non-state entity to be a 
“State.” Thus, at least in light of sections 
1311 and 1321, the meaning of section 
36B appears plain: a federal Exchange is not 
an “Exchange established by the State.” 
B 
The government argues that we should not 
adopt the plain meaning of section 36B, 
however, because doing so would render 
several other provisions of the ACA absurd. 
Our obligation to avoid adopting statutory 
constructions with absurd results is well-
established… But we do not disregard 
statutory text lightly. The Constitution 
assigns the legislative power to Congress, 
and Congress alone, and legislating often 
entails compromises that courts must 
respect. We therefore give the absurdity 
principle a narrow domain, insisting that a 
given construction cross a “high threshold” 
of unreasonableness before we conclude that 
a statute does not mean what it says. A 
provision thus “may seem odd” without 
being “absurd,” and in such instances “it is 
up to Congress rather than the courts to fix 
it,” even if it “may have been an 
unintentional drafting gap.” 
i 
The government first argues that we must 
uphold the IRS Rule to avoid rendering 
language in 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) superfluous. 
Titled “Reconciliation of credit and advance 
credit,” section 36B(f) requires the IRS to 
reduce a taxpayer's end-of-year credit by the 
amount of any advance payments made by 
the government to the taxpayer's insurer to 
offset the cost of monthly premiums. As 
relevant here, section 36B(f) also requires 
“each Exchange”—i.e., both state and 
federal Exchanges—to report certain 
information to the government. With respect 
to any health plan it provides, an Exchange 
must report: 
(A) The level of coverage ... and the 
period such coverage was in effect. 
(B) The total premium for the coverage 
without regard to the credit under this 
section or cost-sharing reductions under 
section 1402 of [the ACA]. 
(C) The aggregate amount of any 
advance payment of such credit or 
reductions.... 
(D) The name, address, and [taxpayer 
identification number (TIN) ] of the 
primary insured and the name and TIN 
of each other individual obtaining 
coverage under the policy. 
(E) Any information provided to the 
Exchange, including any change of 
circumstances, necessary to determine 
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eligibility for, and the amount of, such 
credit. 
(F) Information necessary to determine 
whether a taxpayer has received excess 
advance payments. 
The government contends that these 
reporting requirements assume that credits 
are available on federal Exchanges, and it 
argues that the requirements would be 
superfluous, even nonsensical, as applied to 
federal Exchanges if we were to reject that 
assumption. 
Not so. Even if credits are unavailable on 
federal Exchanges, reporting by those 
Exchanges still serves the purpose of 
enforcing the individual mandate—a point 
the IRS, in fact, acknowledged in 
promulgating a recent regulation. That 
regulation exempts insurers from 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6055, which otherwise would require that, 
for each policy they issue, insurers report to 
the IRS such information as “the name, 
address, and TIN of the primary insured,” 
the dates of coverage, and the “amount (if 
any) or any advance payment ... or of any 
premium tax credit under section 36B with 
respect to such coverage.” The IRS justified 
the exemption for insurers on the ground 
that “Exchanges must report on this 
coverage under section 36B(f)(3).” The 
government's claim that section 36B(f)(3)'s 
reporting requirement serves no purpose 
other than reconciling credits is therefore 
simply not true.  
Furthermore, holding that credits are 
unavailable on federal Exchanges would not 
convert the specific reporting requirements 
concerning credits into an “ ‘empty gesture.’ 
” Those requirements would still allow the 
reconciling of credits on state Exchanges; as 
applied to federal Exchanges, they would 
simply be over-inclusive. Over-
inclusiveness, however, remains a problem 
even if we were to agree that section 
36B allows credits on federal 
Exchanges. Section 36B(f)(3), after all, 
mandates reporting “with respect to any 
health plan provided through the Exchange,” 
even though only plans purchased by 
taxpayers with incomes between 100 and 
400 percent of the federal poverty line may 
be subsidized. A weakness common to both 
views of the availability of credits hardly 
serves as a basis for choosing between them. 
ii 
The government next points to the 
supposedly absurd consequences appellants' 
interpretation of section 36B would have for 
section 1312 of the ACA, which defines the 
rights of “qualified individuals.” The term “ 
‘qualified individual’ means, with respect to 
an Exchange, an individual who—(i) is 
seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in 
the individual market offered through the 
Exchange; and (ii) resides in the State that 
established the Exchange.” If this provision 
is given its plain meaning, then the 36 states 
with federal Exchanges (that, obviously, the 
states did not establish) have no qualified 
individuals. That outcome is absurd, the 
government argues, because in its view 
section 1312 restricts access to Exchanges to 
qualified individuals alone. The absence of 
qualified individuals would mean that 
federal Exchanges have no customers and 
therefore no purpose. The government urges 
us to avoid this outcome by 
construing section 1321 to authorize the 
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federal government to establish Exchanges 
“on behalf of ” states that decline to do so. 
The government, however, tilts at windmills. 
It assumes that when section 1312(a) states 
that “[a] qualified individual may enroll in 
any qualified health plan available to such 
individual and for which such individual is 
eligible,” it means that only a qualified 
individual may enroll in such a plan. The 
obvious flaw in this interpretation is that the 
word “only” does not appear in the 
provision. We have repeatedly emphasized 
that it is “not our role” to “engage in a 
statutory rewrite” by “insert[ing] the word 
‘only’ here and there.” Section 1312(a)'s 
actual language simply establishes the right 
of a qualified individual to enroll in any 
qualified health plan, at any level of 
coverage. On this reading, giving the phrase 
“established by the State” its plain meaning 
creates no difficulty, let alone absurdity. 
Federal Exchanges might not have qualified 
individuals, but they would still have 
customers—namely, individuals who are not 
“qualified individuals.”  
… 
iii 
The government also claims that a plain 
meaning reading of section 36B would have 
peculiar effects under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(gg)(l). That provision states that, as a 
condition of receiving Medicaid funds, a 
State may not tighten its Medicaid eligibility 
standards for adults until “the date on which 
the Secretary determines that an Exchange 
established by the State under [section 1311] 
is fully operational.” If a federally-
established Exchange is not one “established 
by the State,” the government argues, states 
with federal Exchanges “would never be 
relieved of th [is] ... requirement,” 
transforming an “interim measure” into a 
“perpetual obligation.” But appellants 
propose a logical explanation for why the 
ACA might establish this rule: to preserve 
Medicaid benefits for the impoverished 
residents of states where, as a result of 
having federally-established Exchanges, 
subsidies are unavailable. In this light, the 
results produced by giving section 36B its 
plain meaning seem sensible, not absurd.  
iv 
The government urges us, in effect, to strike 
from section 36B the phrase “established by 
the State,” on the ground that giving force to 
its plain meaning renders other provisions of 
the Act absurd. But we find that the 
government has failed to make the 
extraordinary showing required for such 
judicial rewriting of an act of Congress. 
Nothing about the imperative to read section 
36B in harmony with the rest of the ACA 
requires interpreting “established by the 
State” to mean anything other than what it 
plainly says. 
C 
This conclusion places us at a fork in our 
precedent. One line of cases instructs us to 
cease our inquiry and give effect to the 
statute's unambiguous language. Another 
tells us to wade into the legislative history in 
the hope of glimpsing “new light on 
congressional intent.” But, though we 
recognize that our decision about which path 
to travel implicates substantial theoretical 
questions of statutory interpretation, its 
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practical consequences are less momentous 
here because both paths lead to the same 
destination. Therefore, 
assuming arguendo that it is proper to 
consult legislative history when the statutory 
text is clear, we consider what light the 
ACA's history offers. 
We begin by clarifying the role the ACA's 
legislative history might play in our 
analysis… But legislative history is not the 
sole, or even the primary, source of such 
evidence. Rather, “[t]he most reliable guide 
to congressional intent is the legislation the 
Congress enacted.” Where used, legislative 
history plays a distinctly secondary role… 
Instead, only when “apparently plain 
language compels an ‘odd result’ “ might we 
look to legislative history to ensure that the “ 
‘literal application of a statute will [not] 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with 
the intentions of its drafters.’ ” Thus, 
accepting for the sake of argument the 
government's contention that the results of 
appellants' construction of section 36B are 
odd, our inquiry into the ACA's legislative 
history is quite narrow. In the face of the 
statute's plain meaning-a federal Exchange 
is not an “Exchange established by the 
State”—we ask only whether the legislative 
history provides evidence that this literal 
meaning is “demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions” of the ACA's drafters. Unless 
evidence in the legislative record establishes 
that it is, we must hew to the statute's plain 
meaning, even if it compels an odd result. 
Here, the scant legislative history sheds little 
light on the precise question of the 
availability of subsidies on federal 
Exchanges. The government points, for 
example, to a Congressional Budget Office 
report from November 2009, before the 
ACA's adoption, that calculated the cost of 
subsidies based on the assumption that they 
would be available in all states. But that 
assumption is as consistent with an 
expectation that all states would cooperate 
(i.e., establish their own Exchanges) as with 
an understanding that subsidies would be 
available on federal Exchanges as well… 
The government and its amici are thus left to 
urge the court to infer meaning from silence, 
arguing that “during the debates over the 
ACA, no one suggested, let alone explicitly 
stated, that a State's citizens would lose 
access to the tax credits if the State failed to 
establish its own Exchange.” The historical 
record, however, belies this claim. The 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions (HELP) proposed a bill 
that specifically contemplated penalizing 
states that refused to participate in 
establishing “American Health Benefit 
Gateways,” the equivalent of Exchanges, by 
denying credits to such states' residents for 
four years. This is not to say that section 
36B necessarily incorporated this thinking; 
we agree that inferences from unenacted 
legislation are too uncertain to be a helpful 
guide to the intent behind a specific 
provision. But the HELP Committee's bill 
certainly demonstrates that members of 
Congress at least considered the notion of 
using subsidies as an incentive to gain states' 
cooperation. 
In any case, even if the historical record 
were silent, that silence is unhelpful to the 
government. For the court to depart from the 
ACA's plain meaning, which favors 
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appellants, “there must be evidence that 
Congress meant something other than what 
it literally said,” from which the court can 
conclude that applying the statute literally 
would be “ ‘demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of [the ACA's] drafters.’ ” … 
The government, together with the dissent, 
also leans heavily on a more abstract form of 
legislative history Congress's broad purpose 
in passing the ACA-urging the court to view 
section 36B through the lens of the ACA's 
economic theory and ultimate aims. They 
emphasize that to achieve the goals of “near 
universal coverage” and “lower[ing] health 
insurance premiums,” the ACA relies on 
three interrelated policies: insurance market 
reforms prohibiting insurers from denying 
coverage or charging higher premiums 
based on an individual's health status; the 
individual mandate; and subsidies to 
individuals purchasing insurance in the 
individual market. These policies, the 
government and dissent explain, are like the 
legs of a three-legged stool; remove any one, 
and the ACA will collapse. The insurance 
market reforms are necessary to expand the 
availability of insurance. The individual 
mandate is necessary to avoid the adverse 
selection that would result if people could 
exploit the insurance market reforms to wait 
to purchase insurance until they were sick. 
And subsidies are necessary both to make 
the mandated insurance affordable and, in so 
doing, to expand the reach of the individual 
mandate by reducing the cost of insurance 
below the threshold-eight percent of 
household income-at which taxpayers are 
exempt from the mandate's penalty. Given 
this structure, the government and dissent 
argue that it is “inconceivable” to think 
Congress would have risked the ACA's 
stability by making subsidies conditional on 
states establishing Exchanges. 
Yet the supposedly unthinkable scenario the 
government and dissent describe—one in 
which insurers in states with federal 
Exchanges remain subject to the community 
rating and guaranteed issue requirements but 
lack a broad base of healthy customers to 
stabilize prices and avoid adverse 
selection—is exactly what the ACA enacts 
in such federal territories as the Northern 
Mariana Islands, where the Act imposes 
guaranteed issue and community rating 
requirements without an individual mandate. 
This combination, predictably, has thrown 
individual insurance markets in the 
territories into turmoil. But HHS has 
nevertheless refused to exempt the territories 
from the guaranteed issue and community 
rating requirements, recognizing that, 
“[h]owever meritorious” the reasons for 
doing so might be, “HHS is not authorized 
to choose which provisions of the [ACA] 
might apply to the territories.”  
… 
More generally, the ACA's ultimate aims 
shed little light on the “precise question at 
issue,” namely, whether subsidies are 
available on federal Exchanges because such 
Exchanges are “established by the State.” As 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned, 
“it frustrates rather than effectuates 
legislative intent simplistically to assume 
that whatever furthers the statute's primary 
objective must be the law” because “no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” 
Thus, if legislative intent is to be our 
lodestar, we cannot assume, as the 
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government does, that section 36B single-
mindedly pursues the ACA's lofty goals. 
The fact is that the legislative record 
provides little indication one way or the 
other of congressional intent, but the 
statutory text does. Section 36B plainly 
makes subsidies available only on 
Exchanges established by states. And in the 
absence of any contrary indications, that text 
is conclusive evidence of Congress's intent. 
To hold otherwise would be to say that 
enacted legislation, on its own, does not 
command our respect—an utterly untenable 
proposition. Accordingly, applying the 
statute's plain meaning, we find that section 
36B unambiguously forecloses the 
interpretation embodied in the IRS Rule and 
instead limits the availability of premium tax 
credits to state-established Exchanges. 
IV 
We reach this conclusion, frankly, with 
reluctance. At least until states that wish to 
can set up Exchanges, our ruling will likely 
have significant consequences both for the 
millions of individuals receiving tax credits 
through federal Exchanges and for health 
insurance markets more broadly. But, high 
as those stakes are, the principle of 
legislative supremacy that guides us is 
higher still. Within constitutional limits, 
Congress is supreme in matters of policy, 
and the consequence of that supremacy is 
that our duty when interpreting a statute is to 
ascertain the meaning of the words of the 
statute duly enacted through the formal 
legislative process. This limited role serves 
democratic interests by ensuring that policy 
is made by elected, politically accountable 
representatives, not by appointed, life-
tenured judges. 
Thus, although our decision has major 
consequences, our role is quite limited: 
deciding whether the IRS Rule is a 
permissible reading of the ACA. Having 
concluded it is not, we reverse the district 
court and remand with instructions to grant 
summary judgment to appellants and vacate 
the IRS Rule. 
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, 
dissenting: 
This case is about Appellants' not-so-veiled 
attempt to gut the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The ACA 
requires every State to establish a health 
insurance “Exchange,” which “shall be a 
governmental agency or nonprofit entity that 
is established by a State.” The Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) is 
required to establish “such Exchange” when 
the State elects not to create one. Taxpayers 
who purchase insurance from an Exchange 
and whose income is between 100% and 
400% of the poverty line are eligible for 
premium subsidies. Appellants challenge 
regulations issued by the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) and HHS making these 
subsidies available in all States, including 
States in which HHS has established an 
Exchange on behalf of the State. In support 
of their challenge, Appellants rely on a 
specious argument that there is no 
“Exchange established by the State” in 
States with HHS-created Exchanges and, 
therefore, that taxpayers who purchase 




As explained below, there are three critical 
components to the ACA: nondiscrimination 
requirements applying to insurers; the 
“individual mandate” requiring individuals 
who are not covered by an employer to 
purchase minimum insurance coverage or to 
pay a tax penalty; and premium subsidies 
which ensure that the individual mandate 
will have a broad enough sweep to attract 
enough healthy individuals into the 
individual insurance markets to create 
stability. These components work in 
tandem. At the time of the ACA's 
enactment, it was well understood that 
without the subsidies, the individual 
mandate was not viable as a mechanism for 
creating a stable insurance market. 
Appellants' proffered construction of the 
statute would permit States to exempt many 
people from the individual mandate and 
thereby thwart a central element of the 
ACA. As Appellants' amici candidly 
acknowledge, if subsidies are unavailable to 
taxpayers in States with HHS-created 
Exchanges, “the structure of the ACA will 
crumble.” It is inconceivable that Congress 
intended to give States the power to cause 
the ACA to “crumble.” 
Appellants contend that the phrase 
“Exchange established by the State” in § 
36B unambiguously bars subsidies to 
individuals who purchase insurance in States 
in which HHS created the Exchange on the 
State's behalf.” This argument fails because 
“the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.” When the 
language of § 36B is viewed in context -
i.e., in conjunction with other provisions of 
the ACA-it is quite clear that the statute does 
not reveal the plain meaning that Appellants 
would like to find. 
The majority opinion ignores the obvious 
ambiguity in the statute and claims to rest on 
plain meaning where there is none to be 
found. In so doing, the majority misapplies 
the applicable standard of review, refuses to 
give deference to the IRS's and HHS's 
permissible constructions of the ACA, and 
issues a judgment that portends disastrous 
consequences. I therefore dissent. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The first question a reviewing court must 
ask in a case of this sort is whether the 
disputed provisions of the statute are clear 
beyond dispute. “If a court, employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on 
the precise question at issue, that intention is 
the law and must be given effect.” In 
determining whether a statutory provision is 
ambiguous, however, a court must evaluate 
it within the context of the statute as a 
whole: 
[A] reviewing court should not confine 
itself to examining a particular statutory 
provision in isolation. Rather, the 
meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words 
or phrases may only become evident 
when placed in context.... It is a 
fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a 
view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme. 
When a “court determines Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its 
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own construction on the statute.” Rather, 
“the question for the court is whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute,” that is, whether 
the agency's interpretation is “manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”  
Appellants argue that Chevron deference is 
unwarranted because some of the provisions 
at issue “are codified in a chapter of Title 
42 ... the domain of HHS, not the IRS,” and 
the “IRS has no power to enforce or 
administer those provisions.” Appellants' 
position is mistaken. Chevron applies 
because IRS and HHS are tasked with 
administering the provisions of the ACA in 
coordination. Here, there is no issue of one 
agency interpreting the statute in a way that 
conflicts with the other agency's 
interpretation. The IRS's rule defines 
“Exchange” by reference to the HHS's 
definition, which provides that subsidies are 
available to low-income taxpayers 
purchasing insurance on an Exchange 
“regardless of whether the Exchange is 
established and operated by a State ... or by 
HHS.” 
Appellants also argue 
that Chevron deference is precluded by the 
canon that “tax credits ‘must be expressed in 
clear and unambiguous terms.’ ” Again, 
Appellants' position is mistaken. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he 
principles underlying [the] decision 
in Chevron apply with full force in the tax 
context.” 
II. ANALYSIS 
Appellants' argument focuses almost 
entirely on 26 U.S.C. § 36B, considered in 
isolation from the other provisions of the 
ACA. Repeating the phrase “Exchange 
established by the State” as a mantra 
throughout their brief, Appellants contend 
that this language unambiguously indicates 
that § 36B(b) conditions refundable tax 
credits on a State—and not HHS—
establishing an Exchange. 
Appellants' argument unravels, however, 
when the phrase “established by the State” is 
subject to close scrutiny in view of the 
surrounding provisions in the ACA. In 
particular, § 36B has no plain meaning when 
read in conjunction with § 
18031(d)(1) and § 18041(c). And, more 
fundamentally, the purported plain meaning 
of § 36B(b) would subvert the careful policy 
scheme crafted by Congress, which 
understood when it enacted the ACA that 
subsidies were critically necessary to ensure 
that the goals of the ACA could be achieved.  
Perhaps because they appreciate that no 
legitimate method of statutory interpretation 
ascribes to Congress the aim of tearing 
down the very thing it attempted to 
construct, Appellants in this litigation have 
invented a narrative to explain why 
Congress would want health insurance 
markets to fail in States that did not elect to 
create their own Exchanges. Congress, they 
assert, made the subsidies conditional in 
order to incentivize the States to create their 
own exchanges. This argument is 
disingenuous, and it is wrong. Not only is 
there no evidence that anyone 
in Congress thought § 36B operated as a 
condition, there is also no evidence that any 
State thought of it as such. The statutory 
provision presumes the existence of 
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subsidies and was drafted to establish a 
formula for the payment of tax credits, not 
to impose a significant and substantial 
condition on the States. 
In the end, the question for this court is 
whether § 36B unambiguously operates as a 
condition limiting the tax subsidies that 
Congress understood were a necessary part 
of a functioning insurance market 
to only those States that created their own 
exchange. The phrase “Exchange 
established by the State,” standing alone, 
suggests the affirmative. But there is 
powerful evidence to the contrary—both 
in § 36B and the provisions it references, 
and in the Act as a whole-that shows 
Appellants' argument to be fatally flawed. 
It is not the prerogative of this court to 
interpret the ambiguities uncovered in the 
ACA. Congress has delegated this authority 
to the IRS and HHS. And the interpretation 
given by these agencies is not 
only permissible but also 
the better construction of the statute 
because § 36B is not clearly drafted as a 
condition, because the Act empowers HHS 
to establish exchanges on behalf of the 
States, because parallel provisions indicate 
that Congress thought that federal subsidies 
would be provided on HHS-created 
exchanges, and, most importantly, because 
Congress established a careful legislative 
scheme by which individual subsidies 
were essential to the basic viability of 
individual insurance markets. 
A. Appellants' “Plain Meaning” Argument 
Viewed in Context 
We cannot read § 36B in isolation; we must 
also consider the specific context of the 
provision and the “broader context of the 
statute as a whole.” And viewing the matter 
through this wider lens, as we must, the 
provision which initially might appear plain 
is far from unambiguous. To begin with, as 
the Government points out, § 36B refers to 
premiums for health plans enrolled in 
through “an Exchange established by the 
State under 1311 [i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 18031].” 
The cross-referenced provision—42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031—contains language indicating 
that all States are required to establish an 
exchange under the section. In other words, 
if our statutory universe consisted only of 
these two provisions, it would be clear that § 
36B intended that residents in all States 
would receive subsidies because all States 
were required to create such exchanges by 
the section of the Act referenced in § 36B. 
Of course, the ACA is broader than just § 
36B and § 18031, and in 42 U.S.C. § 18041 
it permits a State to elect to allow HHS to 
establish the Exchange on behalf of the 
State. In such circumstances, however, the 
Act requires HHS to establish and operate 
“such Exchange.” The use of “such” can 
reasonably be interpreted to deem the HHS-
created Exchange to be the equivalent of an 
Exchange created in the first instance by the 
State. 
Indeed, the Act says as much when it 
defines the term “Exchange” as “a 
governmental agency or nonprofit entity that 
is established by a State.” It is clear that § 
18031 is the source of the definition of the 
term “Exchange” under the Act. It is also 
clear that § 18031 defines every “Exchange” 
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under the Act as “a governmental agency or 
nonprofit entity that is established by a 
State.” Because § 18041(c) authorizes the 
federal government to establish 
“Exchanges,” the phrase “established by the 
State” in § 18031 must be broad enough to 
accommodate Exchanges created by the 
HHS on a State's behalf. Section 
36B expressly incorporates this broad 
definition of “Exchange” when it uses the 
phrase an “Exchange established by the 
State under [§ 18031].” Therefore, the 
phrase “established by the State” in § 36B is 
reasonably understood to take its meaning 
from the cognate language in the 
incorporated definition in § 18031, which 
embraces Exchanges created by HHS on the 
State's behalf. These provisions belie the 
“plain meaning” that Appellants attempt to 
attribute to § 36B. 
What is more, Appellants' interpretation of 
the operative language in § 36B sits 
awkwardly with the section's structure. 
Subsection (a) provides tax credits to any 
“applicable taxpayer,” defined in reference 
to the poverty line and without regard to 
what the taxpayer's State has or has not 
done. Subsection (b) then establishes a 
numerical formula for calculating the 
amount of the subsidy. It is only in the 
context of this numerical formula and its 
definition of “coverage month” that the 
purported condition is found. If Congress 
intended to create a significant condition on 
taxpayer eligibility for subsidies of the sort 
advocated by Appellants, one would expect 
that it would say so plainly and 
clearly. There is no “if/then” or other such 
conditional language in § 36B.  
B. The Statute Read as a Whole 
1. The “Three–Legged Stool” and the 
Indispensable Role of the Tax Subsidies 
Appellants' interpretation is implausible 
because it would destroy the fundamental 
policy structure and goals of the ACA that 
are apparent when the statute is read as a 
whole. A key component to achieving the 
Act's goal of “near-universal coverage” for 
all Americans is a series of measures to 
reform the individual insurance market. 
These measures—nondiscrimination 
requirements applying to insurers, the 
individual mandate, and premium 
subsidies—work in tandem, each one a 
necessary component to ensure the basic 
viability of each State's insurance market. 
Because premium subsidies are so critical to 
an insurance market's sustainability, 
Appellants' interpretation of § 36B would, in 
the words of Appellants' amici, cause “the 
structure of the ACA [to] crumble.”  
This point is essential and worth explaining 
in detail. The ACA has been described as a 
“three-legged stool” in view of its three 
interrelated and interdependent reforms. The 
first “leg” of the ACA is the “guaranteed 
issue” and “community rating” provisions, 
which prohibit insurers from denying 
coverage based on health status or history, 
and require insurers to offer coverage to all 
individuals at community-wide rates. But 
such nondiscrimination provisions cannot 
function alone because of the problem of 
“adverse selection.” When insurers cannot 
deny coverage or charge sick or high-risk 
individuals higher premiums, healthy people 
delay purchasing insurance (knowing they 
will not be denied coverage if and when they 
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become sick), and insurers' risk pools thus 
become skewed toward high-risk individuals 
(as they are the only ones willing to pay the 
premiums). The result is that insurers wind 
up paying more per average on each policy, 
which leads them to increase the 
community-wide rate, which, in turn, serves 
only to exacerbate the “adverse selection” 
process (as now only those who 
are really sick will find insurance 
worthwhile). This is the so-called “death-
spiral,” which Congress understood would 
doom each State's individual insurance 
market in the absence of a multifaceted 
reform program.  
This is where the individual mandate, the 
second “leg” of the ACA, comes in. 
Congress recognized: 
By significantly increasing health 
insurance coverage, the [individual 
coverage] requirement, together with 
the other provisions of this Act, will 
minimize this adverse selection and 
broaden the health insurance risk pool 
to include healthy individuals, which 
will lower health insurance premiums.  
Accordingly, the Act requires each 
individual who is not covered by an 
employer to purchase minimum coverage or 
to pay a tax penalty. But recognizing that 
individuals cannot be made to purchase what 
they cannot afford, Congress provided that 
the mandate would not apply if the cost of 
insurance exceeds eight percent of the 
taxpayer's income after subsidies. 
The third “leg” of the ACA is the subsidies. 
The subsidies ensure that the individual 
mandate will have a broad enough sweep to 
attract enough healthy individuals into the 
individual insurance markets to create 
stability, i.e., to prevent an adverse-selection 
death spiral. Without the subsidies, the 
individual mandate is simply not viable as a 
mechanism for creating a stable insurance 
market: the lowest level of coverage for 
typical subsidy-eligible participants will cost 
23% of income, meaning that these 
individuals will be exempt from the 
mandate. Congress was informed of the 
importance of the subsidies to the overall 
legislative scheme. It is thus no surprise that 
Congress provided generous subsidies in the 
ACA and, importantly, expressly linked the 
operation of the individual mandate to the 
cost of insurance after taking account of the 
subsidies. 
If nothing else, it is clear that premium 
subsidies are an essential component of the 
regulatory framework established by the 
ACA. If, as Appellants contend, a State 
could block subsidies by electing not to 
establish an Exchange, this would exempt a 
large number of taxpayers from the 
individual mandate, cause the risk pool to 
skew toward higher risk people, and 
effectively cut the heart out of the ACA. 
This is one of the points that was made in 
the joint opinion by Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito 
in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius. 
This “adverse selection” is precisely what 
Congress sought to avoid when it enacted 
the individual mandate.  
Section 36B cannot be interpreted divorced 
from the ACA's unmistakable regulatory 
scheme in which premium subsidies are an 
indispensable component of creating viable 
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and stable individual insurance markets. Due 
regard for the carefully crafted legislative 
scheme casts § 36B in a clearer light. 
“Congress ... does not alter the fundamental 
details of a regulatory scheme in vague 
terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, 
one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.” If Congress meant to deny 
subsidies to taxpayers in States with HHS-
created Exchanges—thereby initiating an 
adverse-selection death-spiral that would 
effectively gut the statute in those States—
one would expect to find this limit set forth 
in terms as clear as day. But the subsection 
defining which taxpayers are eligible for 
subsidies make no mention of State-
established Exchanges. Subsidies are 
available to an “applicable taxpayer,” and 
“applicable taxpayer” is defined as any 
individual whose household income for the 
taxable year is between 100% and 400% of 
the poverty line. 
2. The Advance Payment Reporting 
Requirements of § 36B(f)(3) 
One of the subsections in § 36B—which is 
the section upon which Appellants stake 
their case—makes it clear that Congress 
intended that taxpayers on HHS-created 
Exchanges would be eligible for subsidies. 
Subsection (f), entitled “Reconciliation of 
credit and advance credit,” tasks the IRS 
with reducing the amount of a taxpayer's 
end-of-year premium tax credit under § 
36B by the sum of any advance payments of 
the credit. Crucially, subsection (f) 
establishes reporting requirements 
that expressly apply to HHS-created 
Exchanges. These reporting requirements 
mandate that Exchanges provide certain 
information to the IRS, including the 
“aggregate amount of any advance payment 
of such credit”; information needed to 
determine the taxpayer's “eligibility for, and 
the amount of, such credit”; and 
“[i]nformation necessary to determine 
whether a taxpayer has received excess 
advance payments.” The self-evident 
primary purpose of these requirements—
reconciling end-of-year premium tax credits 
with advance payments of such credits—
could not be met with respect to Exchanges 
created by HHS on behalf of a State if these 
Exchanges were not authorized to deliver 
tax credits. It is thus plain from subsection 
(f) that Congress intended credits under § 
36B to be available to taxpayers in States 
with HHS-created Exchanges. 
In a letter submitted to the court before oral 
argument, Appellants cited an IRS 
regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6055–1(d)(1), that 
addresses information reporting 
requirements. “In order to reduce the 
compliance burden on” insurers, the IRS 
decided not to require insurers “to report 
under section 6055 for coverage under 
individual market qualified health plans 
purchased through an Exchange because 
Exchanges must report on this coverage 
under section 36B(f)(3).” Appellants seem 
to think that this regulation somehow 
vindicates their view of § 36B(f)(3), but 
their argument makes no sense. That the IRS 
determined that additional reporting by 
insurers in specified circumstances was 
unnecessary does not imply that Congress 
drafted § 36B(f)(3) solely to enforce the 
individual mandate, as Appellants would 
have it. What is clear here is that § 
36B(f)(3)establishes reporting requirements 
22 
 
for the principal purpose of requiring 
disclosure of information concerning 
advanced payments of tax credits, a purpose 
which cannot be squared with Appellants' 
interpretation under which no credits are 
available on federally-created Exchanges. 
3. Other Provisions 
There are two other provisions of the ACA 
that strongly support the Government's 
claim that the statute, read as a whole, 
permits taxpayers who purchase insurance in 
non-electing States to receive subsidies. 
First, the statute defines a “qualified 
individual” as a person who “resides in the 
State that established the Exchange.” There 
is no separate definition of “qualified 
individual” for States with HHS-created 
Exchanges. If an HHS-created Exchange 
does not count as established by the State it 
is in, there would be no individuals 
“qualified” to purchase coverage in the 34 
States with HHS-created Exchanges. This 
would make little sense. 
Second, in a subparagraph entitled 
“Assurance of exchange coverage for 
targeted low-income children unable to be 
provided child health assistance as a result 
of funding shortfalls,” the ACA requires 
States to “ensure” that low-income children 
who are not covered under the State's child 
health plan are enrolled in a health plan that 
is offered through “an Exchange established 
by the State under [§ 18031].” Here again, 
the statute simply presumes that the 
existence of such State-established 
exchanges. The statute's objective of 
“assur[ing] exchange coverage for targeted 
low-income children ” would be largely lost 
if States with HHS-created Exchanges are 
excluded. There is nothing in the statute to 
indicate that Congress meant to exclude 
benefits for low-income children in the 34 
States in which HHS has established an 
Exchange on behalf of the State. 
C. Appellants' Extraordinary Subsidies–
As–Incentive Argument 
The record indicates that, when the ACA 
was enacted, no State even considered the 
possibility that its taxpayers would be 
denied subsidies if the State opted to allow 
HHS to establish an Exchange on its behalf. 
Not one. Indeed no State even suggested that 
a lack of subsidies factored into its decision 
whether to create its own Exchange. “States 
were motivated by a mix of policy 
considerations, such as flexibility and 
control, and ‘strategic’ calculations by ACA 
opponents, not the availability of tax 
credits.” The fact that all States recognized 
and protested the Medicaid expansion 
condition, while no State raised any concern 
over the purported subsidy-condition shows 
that Appellants' argument is at best fanciful. 
The single piece of evidence that Appellants 
cite to support their claim that Congress 
intended to restrict subsidies to State-run 
Exchanges is an article by a law professor. 
There is no evidence, however, that anyone 
in Congress read, cited, or relied on this 
article. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory 
language is determined by reference to the 
language itself, the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.” We 
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cannot review a “particular statutory 
provision in isolation.... It is a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the 
words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme.” Following these 
precepts and reading the ACA as a whole, it 
is clear that the statute does not 
unambiguously provide that individuals who 
purchase insurance from an Exchange 
created by HHS on behalf of a State are 
ineligible to receive a tax credit. The 
majority opinion evinces a painstaking 
effort—covering many pages—attempting 
to show that there is no ambiguity in the 
ACA. The result, I think, is to prove just the 
opposite.  
The IRS's and HHS's constructions of the 
statute are perfectly consistent with the 
statute's text, structure, and purpose, while 
Appellants' interpretation would “crumble” 
the Act's structure. Therefore, we certainly 
cannot hold that that the agencies' 
regulations are “manifestly contrary to the 
statute.” This court owes deference to the 
agencies' interpretations of the ACA. 
Unfortunately, by imposing the Appellants' 
myopic construction on the administering 
agencies without any regard for the overall 
statutory scheme, the majority opinion 
effectively ignores the basic tenets of 
statutory construction, as well as the 
principles of Chevron deference. Because 
the proposed judgment of the majority defies 
the will of Congress and the permissible 
interpretations of the agencies to whom 
Congress has delegated the authority to 
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge: 
The plaintiffs-appellants bring this suit 
challenging the validity of an Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) final rule 
implementing the premium tax credit 
provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA” or “Act”). 
The final rule interprets the ACA as 
authorizing the IRS to grant tax credits to 
individuals who purchase health insurance 
on both state-run insurance “Exchanges” 
and federally-facilitated “Exchanges” 
created and operated by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”). The 
plaintiffs contend that the IRS's 
interpretation is contrary to the language of 
the statute, which, they assert, authorizes tax 
credits only for individuals who purchase 
insurance on state-run Exchanges. For 
reasons explained below, we find that the 
applicable statutory language is ambiguous 
and subject to multiple interpretations. 
Applying deference to the IRS's 
determination, however, we uphold the rule 
as a permissible exercise of the agency's 
discretion. We thus affirm the judgment of 




In March of 2010, Congress passed the ACA 
to “increase the number of Americans 
covered by health insurance and decrease 
the cost of health care.” Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB ). To increase the 
availability of affordable insurance plans, 
the Act provides for the establishment of 
“Exchanges,” through which individuals can 
purchase competitively-priced health care 
coverage. Critically, the Act provides a 
federal tax credit to millions of low- and 
middle-income Americans to offset the cost 
of insurance policies purchased on the 
Exchanges. The Exchanges facilitate this 
process by advancing an individual's eligible 
tax credit dollars directly to health insurance 
providers as a means of reducing the upfront 
cost of plans to consumers. 
Section 1311 of the Act provides that 
“[e]ach State shall, not later than January 1, 
2014, establish an American Health Benefit 
Exchange.” However, § 1321 of the Act 
clarifies that a state may “elect” to establish 
an Exchange. Section 1321(c) further 
provides that if a state does not “elect” to 
establish an Exchange by January 1, 2014, 
or fails to meet certain federal requirements 
for the Exchanges, “the Secretary [of HHS] 
shall ... establish and operate such exchange 
within the State....” Only sixteen states plus 
the District of Columbia have elected to set 
up their own Exchanges; the remaining 
thirty-four states rely on federally-facilitated 
Exchanges. 
Eligibility for the premium tax credits is 
calculated according to 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
This section defines the annual “premium 
assistance credit amount” as the sum of the 
monthly premium assistance amounts for 
“all coverage months of the taxpayer 
occurring during the taxable year.” A 
“coverage month” is one in which the 
taxpayer is enrolled in a health plan 
“through an Exchange established by the 
State under section 1311.”  
In addition to the tax credits, the Act 
requires most Americans to obtain 
“minimum essential” coverage or pay a tax 
penalty imposed by the IRS. However, the 
Act includes an unaffordability exemption 
that excuses low-income individuals for 
whom the annual cost of health coverage 
exceeds eight percent of their projected 
household income. The cost of coverage is 
calculated as the annual premium for the 
least expensive insurance plan available on 
an Exchange offered in a consumer's state, 
minus the tax credit described above. The 
tax credits thereby reduce the number of 
individuals exempt from the minimum 
coverage requirement, and in turn increase 
the number of individuals who must either 
purchase health insurance coverage, albeit at 
a discounted rate, or pay a penalty. 
The IRS has promulgated regulations 
making the premium tax credits available to 
qualifying individuals who purchase health 
insurance on both state-run and federally-
facilitated Exchanges. (collectively the “IRS 
Rule”). The IRS Rule provides that the 
credits shall be available to anyone “enrolled 
in one or more qualified health plans 
through an Exchange,” and then adopts by 
cross-reference an HHS definition of 
“Exchange” that includes any Exchange, 
“regardless of whether the Exchange is 
established and operated by a State ... or by 
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HHS.” Individuals who purchase insurance 
through federally-facilitated Exchanges are 
thus eligible for the premium tax credits 
under the IRS Rule. In response to 
commentary that this interpretation might 
conflict with the text of the statute, the IRS 
issued the following explanation: 
The statutory language of section 
36B and other provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act support the 
interpretation that credits are available 
to taxpayers who obtain coverage 
through a State Exchange, regional 
Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and the 
Federally-facilitated Exchange. 
Moreover, the relevant legislative 
history does not demonstrate that 
Congress intended to limit the premium 
tax credit to State Exchanges. 
Accordingly, the final regulations 
maintain the rule in the proposed 
regulations because it is consistent with 
the language, purpose, and structure 
of section 36B and the Affordable Care 
Act as a whole. 
The plaintiffs in this case are Virginia 
residents who do not want to purchase 
comprehensive health insurance. Virginia 
has declined to establish a state-run 
Exchange and is therefore served by the 
prominent federally-facilitated Exchange 
known as HealthCare.gov. Without the 
premium tax credits, the plaintiffs would be 
exempt from the individual mandate under 
the unaffordability exemption. With the 
credits, however, the reduced costs of the 
policies available to the plaintiffs subject 
them to the minimum coverage penalty. 
According to the plaintiffs, then, as a result 
of the IRS Rule, they will incur some 
financial cost because they will be forced 
either to purchase insurance or pay the 
individual mandate penalty. 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the IRS 
Rule exceeds the agency's statutory 
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is 
contrary to law in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The 
plaintiffs contend that the statutory language 
calculating the amount of premium tax 
credits according to the cost of the insurance 
policy that the taxpayer “enrolled in through 
an Exchange established by the State under 
[§ 1311] ” precludes the IRS's interpretation 
that the credits are also available on national 
Exchanges. The district court disagreed, 
finding that the statute as a whole clearly 
evinced Congress's intent to make the tax 
credits available nationwide. The district 
court granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss, and the plaintiffs timely appealed. 
II. 
We must first address whether the plaintiffs' 
claims are justiciable. The defendants make 
two arguments on this point: (1) that the 
plaintiffs lack standing; and (2) that the 
availability of a tax-refund action acts as an 
independent bar to the plaintiffs' claims 
under the APA. 
A. 
We review de novo the legal question of 
whether plaintiffs have standing to sue. 
Article III standing requires a litigant to 
demonstrate “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest” that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “ ‘actual or imminent.’ ” 
The plaintiffs premise their standing on the 
claim that, if they were not eligible for the 
premium tax credits, they would qualify for 
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the unaffordability exemption in 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A and would therefore not be subject to 
the tax penalty for failing to maintain 
minimum essential coverage. Thus, because 
of the credits, the plaintiffs argue that they 
face a direct financial burden because they 
are forced either to purchase insurance or 
pay the penalty. 
We agree that this represents a concrete 
economic injury that is directly traceable to 
the IRS Rule. The IRS Rule forces the 
plaintiffs to purchase a product they 
otherwise would not, at an expense to them, 
or to pay the tax penalty for failing to 
comply with the individual mandate, also 
subjecting them to some financial cost… 
The defendants' argument against standing is 
premised on the claim that the plaintiffs 
want to purchase “catastrophic” insurance 
coverage, which in some cases is more 
expensive than subsidized comprehensive 
coverage required by the Act. The 
defendants thus claim that the plaintiffs have 
acknowledged they would actually 
expend more money on a separate policy 
even if they were eligible for the credits. 
Regardless of the viability of this argument, 
it rests on an incorrect premise. The 
defendants misread the plaintiffs' complaint, 
which, while mentioning the possibility that 
several of the plaintiffs wish to purchase 
catastrophic coverage, also clearly alleges 
that each plaintiff does not want to buy 
comprehensive, ACA-compliant coverage 
and is harmed by having to do so or pay a 
penalty. The harm in this case is having to 
choose between ACA-compliant coverage 
and the penalty, both of which represent a 
financial cost to the plaintiffs. That harm is 
actual or imminent, and is directly traceable 
to the IRS Rule. The plaintiffs thus have 
standing to present their claims. 
B. 
The defendants also argue that the 
availability of a tax-refund action bars the 
plaintiffs' claims under the APA. The 
defendants assert that the proper course of 
action for the plaintiffs is to pay the tax 
penalty and then present their legal 
arguments against the IRS Rule as part of a 
tax-refund action brought under either 26 
U.S.C. § 7422(a) or the Little Tucker Act. 
The defendants do not, nor could they, assert 
this as a jurisdictional bar, but instead point 
to “general equitable principles disfavoring 
the issuance of federal injunctions against 
taxes, absent clear proof that available 
remedies at law [are] inadequate.” The 
defendants argue that a tax refund action 
presents an “adequate remedy” that the 
plaintiffs must first pursue before 
challenging the IRS Rule directly under the 
APA.  
 The defendants' arguments are not 
persuasive. First, they fail to point to a 
single case in which a court has refused to 
entertain a similar suit on the grounds that 
the parties were required to first pursue a 
tax-refund action under 26 U.S.C. § 
7422(a) or 28 U.S .C. § 1346. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs are not seeking a tax refund; they 
ask for no monetary relief, alleging instead 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 
in an attempt to forestall the lose-lose choice 
(in their minds) of purchasing a product they 
do not want or paying the penalty. Section 
7422(a) does not allow for prospective 
relief. Instead, it bars suit “for 
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the recovery of any internal revenue tax 
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally 
assessed or collected.”  Similarly, “[t]he 
Little Tucker Act does not authorize claims 
that seek primarily equitable relief.” 
It is clear, then, that the alternative forms of 
relief suggested by the defendants would not 
afford the plaintiffs the complete relief they 
seek. This is simply not a typical tax refund 
action in which an individual taxpayer 
complains of the manner in which a tax was 
assessed or collected and seeks 
reimbursement for wrongly paid sums. The 
plaintiffs here challenge the legality of a 
final agency action, which is consistent with 
the APA's underlying purpose of 
“remov[ing] obstacles to judicial review of 
agency action.” Requiring the plaintiffs to 
choose between purchasing insurance and 
thereby waiving their claims or paying the 
tax and challenging the IRS Rule after the 
fact creates just such an obstacle. We 
therefore find that the plaintiffs' suit is not 
barred under the APA. 
III. 
Turning to the merits, “we review questions 
of statutory construction de novo.” Because 
this case concerns a challenge to an agency's 
construction of a statute, we apply the 
familiar two-step analytic framework set 
forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. At Chevron's first step, a 
court looks to the “plain meaning” of the 
statute to determine if the regulation 
responds to it. If it does, that is the end of 
the inquiry and the regulation stands.  
However, if the statute is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, the court then 
moves to Chevron's second step and defers 
to the agency's interpretation so long as it is 
based on a permissible construction of the 
statute. 
A. 
At step one, “[i]f the statute is clear and 
unambiguous ‘that is the end of the matter, 
for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.’ ” A statute is ambiguous 
only if the disputed language is “reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations.” … 
Courts should employ all the traditional 
tools of statutory construction in 
determining whether Congress has clearly 
expressed its intent regarding the issue in 
question.  
1. 
In construing a statute's meaning, the court 
“begin[s], as always, with the language of 
the statute.” As described above, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 36B provides that the premium assistance 
amount is the sum of the monthly premium 
assistance amounts for all “coverage 
months” for which the taxpayer is covered 
during a year. A “coverage month” is one in 
which “the taxpayer ... is covered by a 
qualified health plan ... enrolled in through 
an Exchange established by the State under 
[§ ] 1311 of the [Act].” Similarly, the statute 
calculates an individual's tax credit by 
totaling the “premium assistance amounts” 
for all “coverage months” in a given year. 
The “premium assistance amount” is based 
in part on the cost of the monthly premium 
for the health plan that the taxpayer 
purchased “through an Exchange established 
by the State under [§ ] 1311.” 
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The plaintiffs assert that the plain language 
of both relevant subsections in § 36B is 
determinative. They contend that in defining 
the terms “coverage months” and “premium 
assistance amount” by reference to 
Exchanges that are “established by the State 
under [§ ] 1311,” Congress limited the 
availability of tax credits to individuals 
purchasing insurance on state Exchanges. 
Under the plaintiffs' construction, the 
premium credit amount for individuals 
purchasing insurance through a federal 
Exchange would always be zero. 
The plaintiffs' primary rationale for their 
interpretation is that the language says what 
it says, and that it clearly mentions state-run 
Exchanges under § 1311. If Congress meant 
to include federally-run Exchanges, it would 
not have specifically chosen the word 
“state” or referenced § 1311. The federal 
government is not a “State,” and so the 
phrase “Exchange established by the State 
under [§ ] 1311,” standing alone, supports 
the notion that credits are unavailable to 
consumers on federal Exchanges. Further, 
the plaintiffs assert that because state and 
federal Exchanges are referred to separately 
in § 1311 and § 1321, the omission in 26 
U.S.C. § 36B of any reference to federal 
Exchanges established under § 1321 
represents an intentional choice on behalf of 
Congress to exclude federal Exchanges and 
include only state Exchanges established 
under § 1311. 
There can be no question that there is a 
certain sense to the plaintiffs' position. If 
Congress did in fact intend to make the tax 
credits available to consumers on both state 
and federal Exchanges, it would have been 
easy to write in broader language, as it did in 
other places in the statute. 
However, when conducting statutory 
analysis, “a reviewing court should not 
confine itself to examining a particular 
statutory provision in isolation. Rather, [t]he 
meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words 
or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.” With this in mind, the 
defendants' primary counterargument points 
to ACA §§ 1311 and 1321, which, when 
read in tandem with 26 U.S.C. § 36B, 
provide an equally plausible understanding 
of the statute, and one that comports with 
the IRS's interpretation that credits are 
available nationwide. 
As noted, § 1311 provides that “[e]ach State 
shall, not later than January 1, 2014, 
establish an American Health Benefit 
Exchange [.]” It goes on to say that “[a]n 
Exchange shall be a governmental agency or 
nonprofit entity that is established by a 
State,” apparently narrowing the definition 
of “Exchange” to encompass only state-
created Exchanges. ACA § 1311(d)(1). 
Similarly, the definitions section of the Act, 
§ 1563(b), provides that “[t]he term 
‘Exchange’ means an American Health 
Benefit Exchange established under [§ ] 
1311,” further supporting the notion that all 
Exchanges should be considered as if they 
were established by a State. 
Of course, § 1311's directive that each State 
establish an Exchange cannot be understood 
literally in light of § 1321, which provides 
that a state may “elect” to do so. Section 
1321(c) provides that if a state fails to 
establish an Exchange by January 1, 2014, 
the Secretary “shall ... establish and 
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operate such Exchange within the State and 
the Secretary shall take such actions as are 
necessary to implement such other 
requirements.” The defendants' position is 
that the term “such Exchange” refers to a 
state Exchange that is set up and operated by 
HHS. In other words, the statute mandates 
the existence of state Exchanges, but directs 
HHS to establish such Exchanges when the 
states fail to do so themselves. In the 
absence of state action, the federal 
government is required to step in and create, 
by definition, “an American Health Benefit 
Exchange established under [§ ] 1311” on 
behalf of the state. 
Having thus explained the parties' 
competing primary arguments, the court is 
of the opinion that the defendants have the 
stronger position, although only slightly. 
Given that Congress defined “Exchange” as 
an Exchange established by the state, it 
makes sense to read § 1321(c)'s directive 
that HHS establish “such Exchange” to 
mean that the federal government acts on 
behalf of the state when it establishes its 
own Exchange. However, the court cannot 
ignore the common-sense appeal of the 
plaintiffs' argument; a literal reading of the 
statute undoubtedly accords more closely 
with their position. As such, based solely on 
the language and context of the most 
relevant statutory provisions, the court 
cannot say that Congress's intent is so clear 
and unambiguous that it “foreclose[s] any 
other interpretation.”  
 2. 
We next examine two other, less directly 
relevant provisions of the Act to see if they 
shed any more light on Congress's intent. 
First, the defendants argue that reporting 
provisions in § 36B(f) conflict with the 
plaintiffs' interpretation and confirm that the 
premium tax credits must be available on 
federally-run Exchanges. Section 36B(f)—
titled “Reconciliation of credit and advance 
credit”—requires the IRS to reduce the 
amount of a taxpayer's end-of-year premium 
tax credit by the amount of any advance 
payment of such credit. To enable the IRS to 
track these advance payments, the statute 
requires “[e]ach Exchange (or any person 
carrying out 1 or more responsibilities of an 
Exchange under section 1311(f)(3) or 
1321(c) of the [Act] )” to provide certain 
information to the Department of the 
Treasury. There is no dispute that the 
reporting requirements apply regardless of 
whether an Exchange was established by a 
state or HHS. The Exchanges are required to 
report the following information: 
(A) The level of coverage described in 
section 1302(d) of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act and the period 
such coverage was in effect. 
(B) The total premium for the coverage 
without regard to the credit under this 
section or cost-sharing reductions under 
section 1402 of such Act. 
(C) The aggregate amount of any 
advance payment of such credit or 
reductions under section 1412 of such 
Act. 
(D) The name, address, and TIN of the 
primary insured and the name and TIN 
of each other individual obtaining 
coverage under the policy. 
(E) Any information provided to the 
Exchange, including any change of 
circumstances, necessary to determine 
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eligibility for, and the amount of, such 
credit. 
(F) Information necessary to determine 
whether a taxpayer has received excess 
advance payments. 
The defendants argue, sensibly, that if 
premium tax credits were not available on 
federally-run Exchanges, there would be no 
reason to require such Exchanges to report 
the information found in subsections (C), 
(E), and (F). It is therefore possible to infer 
from the reporting requirements that 
Congress intended the tax credits to be 
available on both state- and federally-
facilitated Exchanges. The plaintiffs 
acknowledge that some of the reporting 
requirements are extraneous for federally-
run Exchanges, but note that the other 
categories of reportable information, i.e., 
subsections (A), (B), and (D), remain 
relevant even in the absence of credits. The 
plaintiffs suggest that Congress was simply 
saving itself the trouble of writing two 
separate subsections, one for each type of 
Exchange, by including a single 
comprehensive list. 
The second source of potentially 
irreconcilable language offered by the 
defendants concerns the “qualified 
individuals” provision under ACA § 1312. 
That section sets forth provisions regarding 
which individuals may purchase insurance 
from the Exchanges. It provides that only 
“qualified individuals” may purchase health 
plans in the individual markets offered 
through the Exchanges, and explains that a 
“qualified individual” is a person who 
“resides in the State that established the 
Exchange.” The defendants argue that unless 
their reading of § 1321 is adopted and 
understood to mean that the federal 
government stands in the shoes of the state 
for purposes of establishing an Exchange, 
there would be no “qualified individuals” 
existing in the thirty-four states with 
federally-facilitated Exchanges because 
none of those states is a “State that 
established the Exchange.” This would leave 
the federal Exchanges with no eligible 
customers, a result Congress could not 
possibly have intended. 
The plaintiffs acknowledge that this would 
be untenable, and suggest that the residency 
requirement is only applicable to state-
created Exchanges. They note that § 1312 
states that a “qualified individual”—“with 
respect to an Exchange ”—is one who 
“resides in the State that established the 
Exchange.” Accordingly, because 
“Exchange” is defined as an Exchange 
established under § 1311,i.e., the provision 
directing states to establish Exchanges, the 
residency requirement only limits 
enrollment on state Exchanges. 
Having considered the parties' competing 
arguments on both of the above-referenced 
sections, we remain unpersuaded by either 
side. Again, while we think the defendants 
make the better of the two cases, we are not 
convinced that either of the purported 
statutory conflicts render Congress's intent 
clear. Both parties offer reasonable 
arguments and counterarguments that make 
discerning Congress's intent difficult. 
Additionally, we note that the Supreme 
Court has recently reiterated the admonition 
that courts avoid revising ambiguously 
drafted legislation out of an effort to avoid 
“apparent anomal [ies]” within a statute. It is 
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not especially surprising that in a bill of this 
size—“10 titles stretch[ing] over 900 pages 
and contain [ing] hundreds of provisions,”—
there would be one or more conflicting 
provisions. Wary of granting excessive 
analytical weight to relatively minor 
conflicts within a statute of this size, we 
decline to accept the defendants' arguments 
as dispositive of Congress's intent. 
3. 
The Act's legislative history is also not 
particularly illuminating on the issue of tax 
credits. As both parties concede, the 
legislative history of the Act is somewhat 
lacking, particularly for a bill of this 
size. Several floor statements from Senators 
support the notion that it was well 
understood that tax credits would be 
available for low- and middle-income 
Americans nationwide. For example, 
Senator Baucus stated that the “tax credits 
will help to ensure all Americans can afford 
quality health insurance.” He later estimated 
that “60 percent of those who are getting 
insurance in the individual market on the 
exchange will get tax credits....” … These 
figures only make sense if all financially 
eligible Americans are understood to have 
access to the credits. 
However, it is possible that such statements 
were made under the assumption that every 
state would in fact establish its own 
Exchange. As the district court stated, 
“Congress did not expect the states to turn 
down federal funds and fail to create and run 
their own Exchanges.” The statements 
therefore do not necessarily address the 
question of whether the credits would 
remain available in the absence of state-
created Exchanges. The plaintiffs argue 
extensively that Congress could not have 
anticipated that so few states would establish 
their own Exchanges. Indeed, they argue 
that Congress attempted to “coerce” the 
states into establishing Exchanges by 
conditioning the availability of the credits on 
the presence of state Exchanges. The 
plaintiffs contend that Congress struck an 
internal bargain in which it decided to favor 
state-run Exchanges by incentivizing their 
creation with billions of dollars of tax 
credits. According to the plaintiffs, however, 
Congress's plan backfired when a majority 
of states refused to establish their own 
Exchanges, in spite of the incentives. The 
plaintiffs thus acknowledge that the lack of 
widely available tax credits is counter to 
Congress's original intentions, but consider 
this the product of a Congressional 
miscalculation that the courts have no 
business correcting. 
Although the plaintiffs offer no compelling 
support in the legislative record for their 
argument, it is at least plausible that 
Congress would have wanted to ensure state 
involvement in the creation and operation of 
the Exchanges. Such an approach would 
certainly comport with a literal reading of 26 
U.S.C. § 36B's text. In any event, it is 
certainly possible that the Senators quoted 
above were speaking under the assumption 
that each state would establish its own 
Exchange, and that they could not have 
envisioned the issue currently being 
litigated. Although Congress included a 
fallback provision in the event the states 
failed to act, it is not clear from the 
legislative record how large a role Congress 
expected the federal Exchanges to play in 
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administering the Act. We are thus of the 
opinion that nothing in the legislative history 
of the Act provides compelling support for 
either side's position. 
Having examined the plain language and 
context of the most relevant statutory 
sections, the context and structure of related 
provisions, and the legislative history of the 
Act, we are unable to say definitively that 
Congress limited the premium tax credits to 
individuals living in states with state-run 
Exchanges. We note again that, on the 
whole, the defendants have the better of the 
statutory construction arguments, but that 
they fail to carry the day. Simply put, the 
statute is ambiguous and subject to at least 
two different interpretations. As a result, we 
are unable to resolve the case in either 
party's favor at the first step of 
the Chevron analysis. 
B. 
Finding that Congress has not “directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue,” we 
move to Chevron's second step. At step two, 
we ask whether the “agency's [action] is 
based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.” We “will not usurp an agency's 
interpretive authority by supplanting its 
construction with our own, so long as the 
interpretation is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.’ A 
construction meets this standard if it 
‘represents a reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to 
the agency's care by the statute.’ ” We have 
been clear that “[r]eview under this standard 
is highly deferential, with a presumption in 
favor of finding the agency action valid.” 
… 
What we must decide is whether the statute 
permits the IRS to decide whether the tax 
credits would be available on federal 
Exchanges. In answering this question in the 
affirmative we are primarily persuaded by 
the IRS Rule's advancement of the broad 
policy goals of the Act. There is no question 
that the Act was intended as a major 
overhaul of the nation's entire health 
insurance market. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the broad policy goals of the 
Act: “to increase the number of Americans 
covered by health insurance and decrease 
the cost of health care.” Similarly, Title I of 
the ACA is titled “Quality, Affordable 
Health Care for All Americans”  
Several provisions of the Act are necessary 
to achieving these goals. To begin with, the 
individual mandate requires nearly all 
Americans to have health insurance or pay a 
fine. Increasing the pool of insured 
individuals has the intended side-effect of 
increasing revenue for insurance providers. 
The increased revenue, in turn, supports 
several more specific policy goals contained 
in the Act. The most prominent of these are 
the guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
provisions. In short, these provisions bar 
insurers from denying coverage or charging 
higher premiums because of an individual's 
health status. However, these requirements, 
standing alone, would result in an “adverse 
selection” scenario whereby individuals 
disproportionately likely to utilize health 
care would drive up the costs of policies 
available on the Exchanges. 
Congress understood that one way to avoid 
such price increases was to require near-
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universal participation in the insurance 
marketplace via the individual mandate. In 
combination with the individual mandate, 
Congress authorized broad incentives—
totaling hundreds of billions of dollars—to 
further increase market participation among 
low- and middle-income individuals. A 
Congressional Budget Office report issued 
while the Act was under consideration 
informed Congress that there would be an 
“an influx of enrollees with below-average 
spending for health care, who would 
purchase coverage because of the new 
subsidies to be provided and the individual 
mandate to be imposed.” The report further 
advised Congress that “[t]he substantial 
premium subsidies available in the 
exchanges would encourage the enrollment 
of a broad range of people”; and that the 
structure of the premium tax credits, under 
which federal subsidies increase if 
premiums rise, “would dampen the chances 
that a cycle of rising premiums and 
declining enrollment would ensue.” As the 
defendants further explain, denying tax 
credits to individuals shopping on federal 
Exchanges would throw a debilitating 
wrench into the Act's internal economic 
machinery: 
Insurers in States with federally-run 
Exchanges would still be required to 
comply with guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating rules, but, without 
premium tax subsidies to encourage 
broad participation, insurers would be 
deprived of the broad policy-holder 
base required to make those reforms 
viable. Adverse selection would cause 
premiums to rise, further discouraging 
market participation, and the ultimate 
result would be an adverse-selection 
“death spiral” in the individual 
insurance markets in States with 
federally-run Exchanges. 
It is therefore clear that widely available tax 
credits are essential to fulfilling the Act's 
primary goals and that Congress was aware 
of their importance when drafting the bill. 
The IRS Rule advances this understanding 
by ensuring that this essential component 
exists on a sufficiently large scale. The IRS 
Rule became all the more important once a 
significant number of states indicated their 
intent to forgo establishing Exchanges. With 
only sixteen state-run Exchanges currently 
in place, the economic framework 
supporting the Act would crumble if the 
credits were unavailable on federal 
Exchanges. Furthermore, without an 
exception to the individual mandate, 
millions more Americans unable to purchase 
insurance without the credits would be 
forced to pay a penalty that Congress never 
envisioned imposing on them. The IRS Rule 
avoids both these unforeseen and 
undesirable consequences and thereby 
advances the true purpose and means of the 
Act. 
It is thus entirely sensible that the IRS would 
enact the regulations it did, making Chevron 
deference appropriate. Confronted with the 
Act's ambiguity, the IRS crafted a rule 
ensuring the credits' broad availability and 
furthering the goals of the law. In the face of 
this permissible construction, we must defer 
to the IRS Rule.  
Tellingly, the plaintiffs do not dispute that 
the premium tax credits are an essential 
component of the Act's viability. Instead, as 
explained above, they concede that Congress 
probably wanted to make subsidies available 
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throughout the country, but argue that 
Congress was equally concerned with 
ensuring that the states play a leading role in 
administering the Act, and thus conditioned 
the availability of the credits on the creation 
of state Exchanges. The plaintiffs argue that 
the IRS Rule exceeds the agency's authority 
because it irreconcilably conflicts with 
Congress's goal of ensuring state leadership. 
For the reasons explained above, however, 
we are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' 
“coercion” argument and do not consider it a 
valid basis for circumscribing the agency's 
authority to implement the Act in an 
efficacious manner. 
The plaintiffs also attempt to 
avert Chevron deference by arguing that 
ACA §§ 1311 and 1321 are administered by 
HHS and not the IRS, and that as a result the 
IRS had no authority to enact its final rule. 
However, the relevant statutory language is 
found in 26 U.S.C. § 36B, which is part of 
the Internal Revenue Code and subject to 
interpretation by the IRS. Although the IRS 
Rule adopts by cross-reference an HHS 
definition of “Exchange,” the Act clearly 
gives to the IRS authority to resolve 
ambiguities in 26 U.S.C. § 38B. This clear 
delegation of authority to the IRS relieves us 
of any possible doubt regarding the 
propriety of relying on one agency's 
interpretation of a single piece of a jointly-
administered statute. 
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that a rule of 
statutory construction that requires tax 
exemptions and credits to be construed 
narrowly displaces Chevron deference in 
this case. However, while the Supreme 
Court has stated that tax credits “must be 
expressed in clear and unambiguous terms,” 
the Supreme Court has never suggested that 
this principle displaces Chevron deference, 
and in fact has made it quite clear that it 
does not.  
Rejecting all of the plaintiffs' arguments as 
to why Chevron deference is inappropriate 
in this case, for the reasons explained above 
we are satisfied that the IRS Rule is a 
permissible construction of the statutory 
language. We must therefore apply Chevron 
deference and uphold the IRS Rule.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the district 
court is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED 
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: 
I am pleased to join in full the majority's 
holding that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the Act) “permits” the 
Internal Revenue Service to decide whether 
premium tax credits should be available to 
consumers who purchase health insurance 
coverage on federally-run Exchanges. But I 
am also persuaded that, even if one takes the 
view that the Act is not ambiguous in the 
manner and for the reasons described, the 
necessary outcome of this case is precisely 
the same. That is, I would hold that 
Congress has mandated in the Act that the 
IRS provide tax credits to all consumers 
regardless of whether the Exchange on 
which they purchased their health insurance 
coverage is a creature of the state or the 
federal bureaucracy. Accordingly, 
at Chevron Step One, the IRS Rule making 
the tax credits available to all consumers of 
Exchange-purchased health insurance 
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coverage is the correct interpretation of the 
Act and is required as a matter of law.  
Although the Act expressly contemplates 
state-run Exchanges, Congress created a 
contingency provision that permits the 
federal government, via the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, to “establish 
and operate such Exchange within the State 
and ... take such actions as are necessary to 
implement such other requirements.” This 
contingency provision is triggered when a 
state elects not to set up an Exchange, when 
a state is delayed in setting up an Exchange, 
or when a state Exchange fails to meet 
certain statutory and regulatory 
requirements.  
Enter the premium tax credits, essentially a 
tax subsidy for the purchase of health 
insurance. The amended tax code sets forth 
the formula for calculating the amount of a 
consumer's premium tax credit. In general, 
the credit is equal to the lesser of two 
amounts: the monthly premium for a 
qualified health plan “enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State,” or the 
excess of the adjusted monthly premium for 
a certain type of health plan over a 
percentage of the taxpayer's household 
income.  
Appellants contend that the language 
“enrolled in through an 
Exchange established by the State ” 
precludes the IRS from providing premium 
tax credits to consumers who purchase 
health insurance coverage on federal 
Exchanges. To them, “established by the 
State” in the premium tax credits calculation 
subprovision is the sine qua non of this case. 
An Exchange established by the State is not 
an Exchange established by the federal 
government, they argue; thus, the equation 
for calculating the amount of the premium 
tax credit is wholly inapplicable to all 
consumers who purchase health insurance 
coverage on federally-run Exchanges. 
I am not persuaded and for a simple reason: 
“[E]stablished by the State” indeed means 
established by the state-except when it does 
not, i.e., except when a state has failed to 
establish an Exchange and when the 
Secretary, charged with acting pursuant to a 
contingency for which Congress planned, 
establishes and operates the Exchange in 
place of the state. When a state elects not to 
establish an Exchange, the contingency 
provision authorizes federal officials to 
establish and operate “such Exchange” and 
to take any action adjunct to doing so. 
That disposes of the Appellants' contention. 
This is not a case that calls up the decades-
long clashes between textualists, 
purposivists, and other schools of statutory 
interpretation. The case can be resolved 
through a contextual reading of a few 
different subsections of the statute. If there 
were any remaining doubt over this 
construction, the bill's structure dispels it: 
The contingency provision at § 1321(c)(1) is 
set forth in “Part III” of the bill, titled “State 
Flexibility Relating to Exchanges,” a section 
that appears after the section that creates the 
Exchanges and mandates that they be 
operated by state governments. What's more, 
the contingency provision does not create 
two-tiers of Exchanges; there is no 
indication that Congress intended the 
federally-operated Exchanges to be lesser 
Exchanges and for consumers who utilize 
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them to be less entitled to important 
benefits. Thus, I conclude that a holistic 
reading of the Act's text and proper attention 
to its structure lead to only one sensible 
conclusion: The premium tax credits must 
be available to consumers who purchase 
health insurance coverage through their 
designated Exchange regardless of whether 
the Exchange is state- or federally-operated. 
The majority opinion understandably 
engages with the Appellants and respectfully 
posits they could be perceived to advance a 
plausible construction of the Act, i.e., that 
Congress may have sought to restrict the 
scope of the contingency provision when it 
used the phrase “established by the State” in 
the premium tax credits calculation 
subprovision. But as the majority opinion 
deftly illustrates, a straightforward reading 
of the Act strips away any and all possible 
explanations for why Congress would have 
intended to exclude consumers who 
purchase health insurance coverage on 
federally-run Exchanges from qualifying for 
premium tax credits. Such a reading, the 
majority opinion persuasively explains, is 
not supported by the legislative history or by 
the overall structure of the Act. Moreover, 
the majority carefully and cogently explains 
how “widely available tax credits are 
essential to fulfilling the Act's primary goals 
and [how] Congress was aware of their 
importance when drafting the bill.” Thus, 
the majority correctly holds that Congress 
did not intend a reading that has no 
legislative history to support it and runs 
contrary to the Act's text, structure, and 
goals. Appellants' “literal reading” of the 
premium tax credits calculation 
subprovision renders the entire 
Congressional scheme nonsensical.  
In fact, Appellants' reading is not literal; it's 
cramped. No case stands for the proposition 
that literal readings should take place in a 
vacuum, acontextually, and untethered from 
other parts of the operative text; indeed, the 
case law indicates the opposite. So does 
common sense: If I ask for pizza from Pizza 
Hut for lunch but clarify that I would be fine 
with a pizza from Domino's, and I then 
specify that I want ham and pepperoni on 
my pizza from Pizza Hut, my friend who 
returns from Domino's with a ham and 
pepperoni pizza has still complied with a 
literal construction of my lunch order. That 
is this case: Congress specified that 
Exchanges should be established and run by 
the states, but the contingency provision 
permits federal officials to act in place of the 
state when it fails to establish an Exchange. 
The premium tax credit calculation 
subprovision later specifies certain 
conditions regarding state-run Exchanges, 
but that does not mean that a literal reading 
of that provision somehow precludes its 
applicability to substitute federally-run 
Exchanges or erases the contingency 
provision out of the statute. 
That Congress sometimes specified 
state and federal Exchanges in the bill is as 
unremarkable as it is unrevealing. This was, 
after all, a 900–page bill that purported to 
restructure the means of providing health 
care in this country. Neither the canons of 
construction nor any empirical analysis 
suggests that congressional drafting is a 
perfectly harmonious, symmetrical, and 
elegant endeavor. Sausage-makers are 
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indeed offended when their craft is linked to 
legislating. At worst, the drafters' perceived 
inconsistencies (if that is what they are at 
all) are far less probative of Congress' intent 
than the unqualified and broad contingency 
provision. 
Appellants insist that the use of “established 
by the State” in the premium tax credits 
calculation subprovision is evidence of 
Congress' intent to limit the availability of 
tax credits to consumers of state Exchange-
purchased health insurance coverage. Their 
reading bespeaks a deeply flawed effort to 
squeeze the proverbial elephant into the 
proverbial mousehole. If Congress wanted to 
create a two-tiered Exchange system, it 
would have done so expressly in the section 
of the Act that authorizes the creation of 
contingent, federally-run Exchanges. If 
Congress wanted to limit the availability of 
premium tax credits to consumers who 
purchase health coverage on state-run 
Exchanges, it would have said so rather than 
tinkering with the formula in a subprovision 
governing how to calculate the amount of 
the credit. 
The real danger in the Appellants' proposed 
interpretation of the Act is that it misses the 
forest for the trees by eliding Congress' 
central purpose in enacting the Act: to 
radically restructure the American health 
care market with “the most expansive social 
legislation enacted in decades.” The 
widespread availability of premium tax 
credits was intended as a critical part of the 
bill, a point the President highlighted at the 
bill signing. Appellants' approach would 
effectively destroy the statute by 
promulgating a new rule that makes 
premium tax credits unavailable to 
consumers who purchased health coverage 
on federal Exchanges. But of course, as their 
counsel largely conceded at oral argument, 
that is their not so transparent purpose. 
Appellants, citizens of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, do not wish to buy health 
insurance. Most assuredly, they have the 
right, but not the unfettered right, to decline 
to do so. They have a clear choice, one 
afforded by the admittedly less-than-perfect 
representative process ordained by our 
constitutional structure: they can either pay 
the relatively minimal amounts needed to 
obtain health care insurance as provided by 
the Act, or they can refuse to pay and run 
the risk of incurring a tiny tax penalty. What 
they may not do is rely on our help to deny 
to millions of Americans desperately-needed 
health insurance through a tortured, 
nonsensical construction of a federal statute 
whose manifest purpose, as revealed by the 
wholeness and coherence of its text and 
structure, could not be more clear. 
As elaborated in this separate opinion, I am 
pleased to concur in full in Judge Gregory's 





“Lawyers Challenging Health Subsidies Seek Quick Supreme Court Ruling” 
The LA Times 
David G. Savage 
July 31, 2014 
 
Lawyers challenging President Obama's 
healthcare law filed a quick appeal with the 
Supreme Court on Thursday, urging justices 
to take up the issue this fall and throw out 
insurance subsidies for nearly 5 million 
Americans. 
"The monumental significance of this legal 
issue requires the court's immediate, urgent 
attention," they said in a filing. "The longer 
the lawless IRS rule is in effect, the greater 
the upheaval when it is ultimately vacated." 
Last week, two federal appeals courts 
handed down conflicting rulings on whether 
the Obama administration may pay subsidies 
to low-and middle-income Americans who 
buy insurance on the federal "exchange" 
created under the Affordable Care Act. 
In one ruling from the District of Columbia, 
an appeals court panel said these subsidies 
are illegal in the 36 states that rely on an 
exchange established by federal authorities. 
The judges pointed to a part of the law that 
says tax subsidies may be paid for insurance 
purchased on an exchange "established by 
the state." 
But in a second ruling, an appeals court in 
Virginia rejected this challenge and decided 
Congress intended to offer subsidies 
nationwide regardless of whether consumers 
use a state or federal exchange. 
Under the court's rules, lawyers who lose in 
an appeals court have 90 days to seek a 
review in the Supreme Court. And normally, 
lawyers take the full time. But in this 
instance, the opponents of the Affordable 
Care Act want the court's conservative 
justices to have a chance to take up the new 
healthcare case in a few months so they can 
rule by next spring.  
The Obama administration has the opposite 
strategy on timing. The Justice Department 
said it planned to ask the full appeals court 
in the District of Columbia to reconsider last 
week's ruling by a three-judge panel. If so, 
that could delay a final ruling from the 
appeals court until next year and push off a 
Supreme Court decision to 2016. 
By then, millions of Americans will have 
relied for several years on having health 
insurance they could afford thanks to the 
subsidies. A single adult with an income up 
to $45,960 and a family of four with an 
income up $94,200 may obtain insurance on 
an exchange at a reduced cost. 
The appeal filed Thursday is funded by the 
libertarian Competitive Enterprise Institute. 
Late last week, the group publicized a video 
from 2012 in which a leading academic 
advocate of the healthcare law says states 
must establish insurance exchanges or lose 
subsidies for its citizens.  
Jonathan Gruber, an MIT economist who 
advised Democrats on the healthcare law, 
was asked at a conference whether the 
federal government could run an exchange if 
the states refused. Yes, Gruber said. "If the 
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states don't provide them, the federal 
backstop will. The federal government has 
been sort of slow in putting out its backstop, 
I think partly because they want to sort of 
squeeze the states to do it. I think what's 
important to remember politically about this 
is, if you are a state and you don't set up an 
exchange, that means your citizens don't get 
their tax credits." 
In appealing to the Supreme Court, the 
lawyers quote Gruber's statement as 
evidence that the sponsors of the law 
intended to limit subsidies to those states 
which established an exchange. 
Defenders of the law have insisted that view 
is absurd. They say the Democrats who 
wrote the law intended that subsidies would 
be offered to everyone who qualified and 
that the federal exchanges were intended to 




“Halbig, King Decisions Overturning Subsidies May Hinder ACA 
Implementation” 
Wolters Kluwer 
August 4, 2014 
The ultimate outcomes of Halbig v 
Burwell and King v Burwell, remain to be 
seen. However, the overturn of 26 USC Sec. 
36B that may result is predicted to “broadly 
undermine the implementation” of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), according to a report by the Urban 
Institute and the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. Consequences of the possible 
overturn of Sec. 36B, which provides 
premium subsidies for plans on the federally 
facilitated Marketplaces (FFMs), are likely 
to include increases in premiums and 
uninsured rates. 
Recent decisions. In Halbig, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the IRS 
regulation that provides for federal funding 
for subsidies to aid in the purchase of health 
insurance through the FFMs, stating, “[W]e 
conclude that the ACA unambiguously 
restricts the section 36B subsidy to 
insurance purchased on Exchanges 
‘established by the State.’” Previous oral 
arguments turned on whether the legislative 
history showed intent to use premium tax 
subsidies as an incentive for states to create 
their own Exchanges. The D.C. Circuit had 
been dubious of the government’s 
arguments against such an interpretation of 
the legislative intent—especially 
considering that the words “established by 
the state” appeared in the statute’s language 
eight or nine times. 
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in King found 
the ACA’s language—which the D.C. 
Circuit purported to limit such tax credits to 
state-run Exchanges—“ambiguous and 
subject to multiple interpretations,” and gave 
the IRS deference its application of tax 
credits to FFMs. 
Implications in coverage and 
subsidies. According to the report, which 
was written before the release of 
the King and Halbig decisions, nearly 12 
million enrollments are expected in the 34 
FFMs in 2016. Of those enrollments, an 
estimated 7.3 million individuals will 
receive federal subsidies to aid in the 
purchase of health insurance through the 
Marketplaces, and many are expected to pay 
lower copayments, deductibles, and 
coinsurance through cost-sharing subsidies. 
If Sec. 36B is ultimately overturned, it 
would “[translate] into a loss of $36.1 billion 
in 2016 of funds that would otherwise go to 
individuals and families with incomes below 
400 percent of the federal poverty level.” 
The effects of the overturn of Sec. 36B also 
are predicted to cause spillover effects to 
state economies, which will likely 
experience a loss of federal funding, 
according to the report. The study estimated 
losses as high as $4.8 billion in Florida and 
$5.6 billion in Texas. Twenty-four of the 34 
states are already foregoing federal funding 
in choosing not to expand Medicaid under 
the ACA. The report suggests that the 34 
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FFM states consider creating their own 
state-based Marketplaces to avoid the 
consequences of an overturn of Sec. 36B. 
Effects on other ACA 
components. According to the report, the 
elimination of the premium tax subsidies 
“would have a domino effect on other 
components of the ACA, as well.” Among 
the effects predicted in the report is an 
increase in the number of uninsured as a 
result of unaffordable premium costs in the 
absence of subsidies, resulting in an increase 
of individual mandate penalties. The report 
also suggests that the shrinking of the 
insurance pool is likely to result in insurers 








“After Health Law Rulings, Here are Possible Next Steps” 
The New York Times (The Upshot) 
Margot Sanger-Katz 
July 22, 2014 
 
We now have two federal appeals courts that 
have issued conflicting rulings on a major 
provision of the Affordable Care Act. Those 
decisions are not the final word on whether 
residents of some states will be able to 
continue receiving financial assistance to 
buy health insurance. Here are some 
possible next steps: 
All the judges on the D.C. Circuit could 
decide the Halbig v. Burwell case. There is 
a process called “en banc” review in which 
the case would be reargued before all of the 
11 judges on the D.C. Circuit Court, and the 
Obama administration has said it will ask 
the court for such a review. A majority of 
the judges would have to agree to rehear the 
case for it to be reconsidered in this way. 
Appellate courts rarely accept cases for en 
banc review, but this is a big one. Many 
legal experts think that the full court would 
view the government’s position more 
favorably than the two judges who ruled 
against them in the original decision on 
Tuesday; legal questions don’t necessarily 
break down along political lines, but 
Democratic appointees outnumber 
Republican appointees on the court and 
include four new judges recently appointed 
by President Obama. 
The law’s challengers could ask the 
Fourth Circuit to reconsider King v. 
Burwell. Same rules apply, and the Fourth 
Circuit also has more judges appointed by 
Democrats than Republicans. 
Decisions will be issued by other courts. 
The plaintiffs in the Virginia and D.C. cases 
are not the only ones challenging tax 
subsidies in the Affordable Care Act. Two 
trial court cases raise similar issues, one in 
Oklahoma and one in Indiana. Those cases 
could also go to appellate courts. Oklahoma 
is in the 10
th
 Circuit; Indiana is in the 7
th
. 
Depending on the outcomes of the various 
rulings, all courts could end up agreeing, or 
there could remain a disagreement between 
different circuits. 
Either side—or both—could appeal the 
rulings to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court can pick which case it wants 
to hear; four judges must vote to take a case 
for it to be added to the court’s schedule. 
The Supreme Court generally rejects most 
petitions for a hearing but tends to intervene 
when circuit courts disagree about a 
substantive issue of law. The current 
disagreement between the D.C. and Fourth 
Circuits is a good example of the type of 
split that usually gets its attention. 
The Supreme Court could decide the case. 
In addition to deciding whether tax subsidies 
can be used in states without their own 
exchanges, the court would face another 
question if it ruled in favor of the 
challengers:  What happens to the tax credits 
that have already been handed out? 
Congress could act. The legal question 
came up because of ambiguities in the 
drafting of the Affordable Care Act that 
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made it unclear when tax subsidies should 
apply. If it was so inclined—a big if, in this 
polarized climate—Congress could fix the 
language and clarify who is eligible for the 
federal money. 
States could act. Right now, 36 states are 
relying on the federal government to run at 
least parts of their insurance marketplaces, 
meaning that their residents could lose 
access to tax credits if the D.C. Circuit case 
is upheld. But any of those states could 
choose to switch to a state exchange, where 
the law is clear that the tax credits do apply. 
A few states are already working on 
switching from federal to state exchanges. 
Others might consider a similar shift, though 

































“Supreme Court Could Hear Obamacare Subsidy Feud” 
CNBC Business 
July 31, 2014 
 
Let's get ready to rumble. 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday was 
asked to hear a case that is considered 
perhaps the single biggest current threat to 
Obamacare. 
The case hinges on the question of whether 
the federal government can give billions of 
dollars in financial aid to people who buy 
Obamacare insurance on HealthCare.gov. 
The request to fast-track a final decision on 
that issue comes a week after judicial panels 
in separate federal appeals circuits issued 
conflicting rulings on the legality of such 
subsidies for enrollees on that federally run 
Obamacare exchange. Financial aid given 
customers of state-run marketplaces is not 
being challenged. 
If the Supreme Court takes the case, and 
ultimately rules for the plaintiffs, it would 
render illegal tax credits that helped nearly 5 
million people buy insurance on 
HealthCare.gov, which sells health plans 
insurance in 36 states. 
For now, those subsidies, which go to 86 
percent of federal exchange customers, 
remain legal. 
If the high court said the HealthCare.gov 
subsidies were illegal, it also would destroy 
or cripple in those affected states two major 
Obamacare mandates, which impose fines if 
certain employers don't offer health 
insurance to workers, and if individuals 
don't obtain health coverage. 
The Competitive Enterprise Institute, the 
group that has backed several court 
challenges to the Obamacare subsidies, 
announced the petition had been filed. 
For the Supreme Court to take the case, it 
would require at least four justices to agree 
to hear it. If the court takes the case, it could 
be heard after it opens its next term in 
October, and decided by next May. 
"From the time these case were first filed, 
we've tried to get this issue resolved as 
quickly as possible for the plaintiffs and the 
millions of individual like them," said CEI 
general counsel Sam Kazman. 
"A fast resolution is also vitally important to 
the states that chose not to set up exchanges, 
to the employers in those states who face 
either major compliance costs or huge 
penalties, and to employees who face 
possible layoffs or reductions in their work 
hours as a result of this illegal IRS rule," 
Kazman said 
"Our petition today to the Supreme Court 
represents the next step in that process." 
Kazman noted that two days after last 
week's split rulings, a 2012 video surfaced 
of MIT economist Jonathan Gruber, one of 
the architects of Obamacare, saying that 
residents of states that did not establish their 
own Obamacare exchanges would not be 
eligible for subsidies. 
"If you're a state and you don't set up an 
exchange, that means your citizens don't get 
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their tax credits. … I hope that's a blatant 
enough political reality that states will get 
their act together and realize there are 
billions of dollars at stake here in setting up 
these exchanges, and that they'll do 
it," Gruber told his audience on the video. 
CEI, in a press release, said Gruber's 
comment :contradicts the current claim by 
the government: that Congress never 
intended to withhold subsidies." The petition 
asking the Supreme Court to take up the 
case cites Gruber's remarks. 
Timothy Jost, a law professor who argues 
that the subsidies are legal regardless of 
what kind of government exchange they're 
issued through, said, "This is an act of 
desperation to keep a case alive which was 
always an act of desperation by advocates 
who have been unable in succeed in 
Congress." 
But Michael Cannon, director of health 
studies at the Cato Institute and one of the 
intellectual godfathers of the challenge to 
the subsidies, said it was "the right decision" 
to ask the Supreme Court to settle the issue 
once and for all. 
"There are tens of millions of individuals 
and a quarter-million businesses, dozens of 
insurance companies and three dozen states 
that need to have this issue resolved and 
resolved quickly," Cannon said. "It's not a 
small issue." 
"Even if all those people's economic 
decisions were" not at issue, he said. 
"There's a question of whether the president 
of the United State is borrowing, and 
spending and taxing tens of billions of 
dollars without Congressional 
authorization," Cannon said. He said there 
are "probably" enough votes on the court to 
grant the petition to be heard. 
The Supreme Court is being asked to reverse 
3-0 ruling by a panel of judges in the Fourth 
Circuit federal appeals court last week that 
upheld the legality of financial aid given to 
enrollees on a federally-run Obamacare 
exchange. That case is known as King v. 
Burwell. 
Another federal appeals court panel sitting 
in Washington, D.C., in a bombshell, 2-1, 
decision, ruled those subsidies are illegal 
because they were issued to enrollees on the 
federal exchange HealthCare.gov. In that 
case, known as Halbig v. Burwell, the 
Obama administration intends to seek a 
reversal of the decision by a so-called en 
banc panel made up f all judges in the D.C. 
appeals circuit. 
A senior Obama administration official, 
speaking on the condition of anonymity, 
said, "We think that the Fourth Circuit's 
unanimous panel made the right decision, 
agreeing with Congress and common sense." 
"As we have previously said, the 
government is following the normal process 
and seeking a full review of 2-1 decision in 
the Halbig case. If the en banc D.C. Circuit 
rules in favor of the government, there will 
be no split in the courts of appeals and no 
need for Supreme Court review." 
"This litigation should be seen for what it is 
– another partisan attempt to undermine the 




The Obama administration survived a 
challenge to Obamacare at the Supreme 
Court, when a majority that surprisingly 
included conservative Chief Justice John 
Roberts upheld most elements of the 
Affordable Care Act, including the mandate 
that most Americans obtain health insurance 
or pay a tax penalty. 
But neither the administration nor supporters 
of Obamacare relish having the high court 
take up the question of subsidies, 
particularly after a recent Supreme Court 
ruling that went against the administration in 
an Obamacare case. 
In that case, known as Hobby Lobby, the 
high court said that certain companies could 
claim a religious exemption to the mandate 
that their health plans covers contraception 
without requiring employees to pay out-of-
pocket costs. 
Plaintiffs in both subsidy-related cases claim 
the Affordable Care Act as written only 
allows financial aid to be given to customers 
of state-run Obamacare marketplaces. The 
ACA, in fact, explicitly only mentions such 
aid in the context of it being given to state-
run exchange enrollees. 
The Obama administration, and Obamacare 
advocates, in turn argue that is a too-narrow 
reading of the statute, and that it ignores 
what they say was Congress' obvious 
intention to make financial aid available to 
all qualified individuals, regardless of where 
they purchased insurance. 
Subsidies issued to people who buy 
Obamacare plans on one of 15 exchanges 
run by individual states and the District of 
Columbia are not threatened by the cases. 
About 2 million people receiving such 
financial aid this year. 
There is no right to have a case heard by the 
Supreme Court. It will be up to the justices 
on the court whether to take the case. 
It is possible they will let the issue be sorted 
out first by the lower federal appeals courts. 
The administration is considered to have the 
edge in such a so-called "en banc" review by 
the full appeals court because judges 
appointed by Democratic presidents hold a 
7-4 edge over Republican appointees in that 
circuit. 
Last fall, US Senate Majority Harry Reid, 
D-Nev., changed Senate rules to remove the 
ability of senators to use a filibuster to 
prevent judicial nominations below the 
Supreme Court. Reid's move set in motion 
the seating of three judges appointed by 
President Obama to the D.C. appeals circuit 
— who are part of that three-vote margin in 
the administration's favor on the court now. 
If the administration won an en banc review 
in the D.C. circuit, then there would be no 
split with the Fourth Circuit in their view of 
the subsidies' legality. That, in turn, would 
make it less likely for the Supreme Court to 
consider an appeal by the plaintiffs. 
Jost, the Washington and Lee University 
School of Law professor who has been a key 
player in the debate over the subsidies, said, 
"The Justice Department has already said 
that it will file for en banc review with the 
full D.C.circuit." 
Once that happens, it is likely that [D.C. 
Circuit judge Thomas]Griffith's obviously 
political decision will be set aside. In the 
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absence of a division between the D.C. 
Circuit and Fourth Circuit, it is very unlikely 
the Supreme Court will take the case, unless 
it is willing to make an overtly politically 
partisan move," Jost said. 
There are two other similar cases pending in 
federal courts in Indiana and Oklahoma, but 
neither has reached the appellate level. 
The Wall Street Journal editorial page last 
week urged Michael Carvin, the lawyer who 
has been representing the plaintiffs in both 
pending appeals, to skip asking the Fourth 
Circuit for an en banc review of its decision, 
and instead to petition the Supreme Court to 
hear the case, and resolve the issue once and 
for all. 
Carvin's chances with an en banc review at 
the Fourth Circuit are not rated very high by 
people on both sides of the argument. 
Obamacare supporters have long scoffed at 
the claims of the plaintiffs, but they have 
readily conceded the fact that if the plaintiffs 
prevailed it would be a dire threat to the 
goals of the Affordable Care Act. 
If the Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiffs, 
it would prevent billions of dollars worth of 
taxpayer funded subsidies from being given 
to help people buy insurance on a federally-
run exchange. 
Such a ruling also would destroy in those 
HealthCare.gov-served states a looming 
Obamacare rule that will require most mid- 
and large-sized employers to offer 
affordable health coverage to workers or pay 
a fine. 
That's because those fines only take effect if 
a worker at such a company buys a plan 
from an Obamacare exchange with financial 
aid from the government. 
And, such a ruling also would effectively 
cripple, again in those states, another 
Obamacare rule that compels individuals to 
have some form of health coverage or pay a 
tax penalty. Without subsidies, insurance 
sold on HealthCare.gov would be considered 
unaffordable for many people under the 
rules of Obamacare, and they would be 
exempt from the penalty for not having 
insurance. 
If the Supreme Court invalidated the 
HealthCare.gov subsidies, states currently 
served by that exchange would be free — as 
they are now — to set up their own 
exchanges that would sell subsidized 
coverage to their residents. 
While some states might do so, many others, 
led by Republican governors and 
Republican-controlled legislatures, would be 
unlikely to set up an exchange because it 
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The Affordable Care Act — Obamacare — 
has endured so many near-death experiences 
that digging into the details of still another 
effort to demolish it is admittedly not an 
inviting prospect. (My own reaction, I 
confess, to hearing some months back about 
the latest legal challenge — this one aimed 
at the supposed effect of a single word in the 
900-page statute — was something along the 
lines of “wake me when it’s over.”) 
But stay with me, because this latest round, 
catapulted onto the Supreme Court’s docket 
earlier this month by the same forces that 
brought us the failed Commerce Clause 
attack two years ago, opens a window on 
raw judicial politics so extreme that the saga 
so far would be funny if the potential 
consequences weren’t so serious. 
To be clear, I’m not suggesting that there is 
anything wrong with turning to the courts to 
achieve what politics won’t deliver; we all 
know that litigation is politics by other 
means. (Think school desegregation. Think 
reproductive rights. Think, perhaps, same-
sex marriage.) Nor is the creativity and 
determination of the Affordable Care Act’s 
opponents any great revelation — not after 
they came within a hairsbreadth of getting 
the law’s individual mandate thrown out on 
a constitutional theory that would have been 
laughed out of court not too many years ago. 
Boy, are they ever determined. Flash back to 
December 2010, when the Commerce 
Clause challenges to the new law were 
beginning to fill the legal pipeline en route 
to the Supreme Court. At a conference held 
at the American Enterprise Institute, a 
conservative research organization in 
Washington, Michael S. Greve, an A.E.I. 
scholar and chairman of the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, had this to say in 
reference to the Affordable Care Act: 
“This bastard has to be killed as a 
matter of political hygiene. I do not care 
how this is done, whether it’s 
dismembered, whether we drive a stake 
through its heart, whether we tar and 
feather it and drive it out of town, 
whether we strangle it. I don’t care who 
does it, whether it’s some court some 
place, or the United States Congress. 
Any which way, any dollar spent on 
that goal is worth spending, any brief 
filed toward that end is worth filing, any 
speech or panel contribution toward that 
end is of service to the United States.” 
Mr. Greve went on to urge a litigating 
strategy that looked beyond the mandate 
to “concentrate on bits and pieces of 
this law.” 
And that’s exactly what his Competitive 
Enterprise Institute proceeded to do. It is 
financing a set of lawsuits with a seemingly 
modest ambition: seeking not a 
constitutional ruling but a mere statutory 
interpretation. The suits put forward an 
interpretation of the statutory language that 
would deny tax credits to people who buy 
insurance on the exchanges set up by the 
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federal government in the 36 states that have 
refused to establish their own exchanges. If 
the Supreme Court buys that statutory 
argument, a core goal of the Affordable Care 
Act — facilitating the purchase of insurance 
by people of modest income — would be 
undermined to the point of collapse. Modest 
indeed. 
(The video from the American Enterprise 
Institute conference has been making its way 
around the internet; Mr. Greve’s comments 
are just past the one hour, 30 minute mark. I 
first saw it on the website of 
the Constitutional Accountability Center, a 
progressive Washington-based think tank 
and legal shop.) 
It was at the American Enterprise Institute 
conference that the statutory argument first 
came to light, in a Power Point presentation 
by a lawyer from Greenville, S.C., Thomas 
M. Christina, who specializes in employee 
benefits. He said he had essentially stumbled 
on the reference in Section 36B of the act 
that refers to the availability of tax credits to 
offset the cost of insurance plans “enrolled 
in through an exchange established by the 
state.” His conclusion was that the tax 
credits — the federal subsidy that makes the 
system work — were not available in what 
he called the “non-capitulating states,” those 
that refused to set up exchanges and, as 
another section of the law permitted them to 
do, left the job to the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
I know and like Michael Greve, who is now 
a law professor at George Mason University; 
the rhetorical excess he exhibited at that 
conference is part of his charm. And of 
course, the motivations of those who 
“cobbled the cases together,” in Mr. Greve’s 
description in a recent blog post, say nothing 
about the merits of their argument. 
Nonetheless, as origin stories go, this makes 
for a good one. 
As to the merits, six federal appellate judges 
have evaluated the statutory argument, and 
four have rejected it. One judge, Harry T. 
Edwards of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
called the case “specious,” a “not-so-veiled 
attempt to gut” the law in defiance of “the 
will of Congress.” 
The problem is that Judge Edwards’s totally 
persuasive opinion was written in dissent. 
The majority opinion, concluding that the 
Internal Revenue Service is without 
statutory authority to issue tax credits for 
insurance purchased on the federally 
established exchanges where more than five 
million people have bought their health 
insurance, was written by Judge Thomas B. 
Griffith and joined by Judge A. Raymond 
Randolph. 
Judge Griffith is a thoughtful judge who 
spent five years as the Senate’s legal 
counsel; sadly, whatever he learned in that 
job about the legislative process was not on 
display in this opinion, Halbig v. Burwell. 
(Of course there are ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in a 900-page bill that never 
went to a conference committee for a final 
stitching together of its many provisions.) 
Judge Randolph is one of the most 
outspoken and agenda-driven conservatives 
on the entire federal bench. In a speech to 
the far-right Heritage Foundation in 2010, 
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for example, he denounced the Supreme 
Court for having granted habeas corpus 
rights to the Guantánamo detainees and 
compared the justices to Tom and Daisy 
Buchanan in “The Great Gatsby,” “careless 
people who smashed things up” and “let 
other people clean up the mess they made.” 
He then proceeded in a series of opinions on 
the appeals court to shrink the detainees’ 
habeas right to the vanishing point that it 
eventually reached. 
The decision joined by the two judges 
trained a laser focus on a single section, 
indeed on a single word, in the massive 
statute: the reference to “an exchange 
established by the state.” The opinion not 
only ignored the broader context, in which 
Congress clearly intended to make insurance 
affordable so that as many healthy people as 
possible would join an economically viable 
pool, but also rejected the government’s 
argument that language in other sections of 
the law supported the view that Congress 
didn’t mean to treat the state and federal 
exchanges differently. 
Section 1321(c) provides that if a state fails 
to establish an exchange, the secretary of 
Health and Human Services shall “establish 
and operate such Exchange within the state 
and the Secretary shall take such actions as 
are necessary to implement such other 
requirements.” The words “such Exchange,” 
the government argues, mean that the 
federal government stands in the state’s 
shoes when it complies with this instruction; 
for these purposes, the federal government is 
the state. 
That interpretation “makes sense,” all three 
members of a three-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va., concluded 
in King v. Burwell, a decision that, by an 
amazing coincidence of timing, was issued 
the same day, July 22, as the contrary D.C. 
Circuit opinion. Those three judges, Roger 
L. Gregory, Stephanie D. Thacker and 
Andre M. Davis, examined the statute as a 
whole, in light of its purpose, and at the end 
of the day found the federal-state issue to be 
ambiguous. That’s all they needed to find 
for the government to win the case. 
To avoid the Chevron rule, the D.C. Circuit 
majority had to find that the statute was 
clear in ruling out tax credits on the federal 
exchanges. The majority even shed a few 
crocodile tears: “We reach this conclusion, 
frankly, with reluctance.” The conclusion is 
simply wrong.  The Supreme Court has a 
clear rule on what courts should do about 
agency regulations adopted in the face of 
statutory ambiguity: as long as the agency’s 
action is based on a permissible 
interpretation of the statute, courts must 
defer to the agency. The situation is so 
common that the 30-year-old decision 
establishing the deference rule, Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council is one 
of the most frequently cited of all Supreme 
Court decisions. 
In fact, one judge on the Fourth Circuit 
panel, Andre M. Davis, wrote a separate 
concurring opinion to say that the statute 
was completely clear in the other direction. 
The plaintiffs’ argument, he said, was based 
on “a tortured, nonsensical construction of a 
federal statute whose manifest purpose, as 
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revealed by the wholeness and coherence of 
its text and structure, could not be more 
clear.” 
With the two contrary decisions having 
come down on the same day, the judicial 
politics surrounding the fate of the 
Affordable Care Act immediately got rich. 
The Obama administration quickly 
announced its intention to seek rehearing by 
the entire 11-member D.C. Circuit; it filed 
its rehearing petition on August 1. Michael 
A. Carvin, the lawyer for the law’s 
opponents (he argued the two cases) might 
have made the same request to the Fourth 
Circuit. But he did the opposite: he appealed 
to the Supreme Court, taking only two 
weeks to file his petition instead of the 
allotted 90 days. The race was on. 
What, exactly, is the race? Clearly, the law’s 
opponents have their best chance — indeed, 
probably their only chance — in the 
Supreme Court. They not only lost in the 
Fourth Circuit, but they are likely to lose in 
the D.C. Circuit as well if that court, its 
membership recently bolstered by four 
Obama appointees, grants rehearing. And 
conversely, the administration has a clearer 
path to victory before the entire appeals 
court than it does in the Supreme Court. So 
the opponents’ challenge is to persuade the 
justices to take the case as quickly as 
possible. And the best way to do that is to 
keep the D.C. Circuit panel’s opinion on the 
books. 
Why? Because the one reliable marker of a 
case the justices deem worthy of their 
attention is a conflict in the federal circuits 
on an important legal issue. But a decision 
by the D.C. Circuit’s judges to grant 
rehearing automatically wipes the panel 
opinion off the books, even before the 
rehearing itself takes place. With the panel 
opinion vacated, there would be no conflict 
— only a single ruling, a government win in 
the Fourth Circuit, not (if neutral principles 
govern, as of course they may not) a 
particularly attractive case for Supreme 
Court review. 
So the opponents’ effort is trained on 
persuading the D.C. Circuit not to grant 
rehearing or — if that effort fails — to 
delegitimize a grant of rehearing in the eyes 
of friendly Supreme Court justices. The 
conservative blogosphere has been buzzing 
with messages to the appeals court, bank 
shots intended to be read by the justices, or 
at least their law clerks. Carrie Severino, a 
former clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas 
who blogs for National Review, wrote 
earlier this month that “clearly this type of 
case is exactly what the President had in 
mind when he made his court-packing blitz 
last year.” Would the new judges be “willing 
to take the fall for the president in this case,” 
she wondered: “Now those judges will have 
to decide whether they want their first high-
profile act on the court to be one that is 
baldly political: overturning a meticulously 
reasoned decision that overturned the IRS’s 
attempt to rewrite the Affordable Care Act. 
It would make the new judges look like 
presidential pawns who are attempting to 
save his bacon, lowering them to the level of 
the disgraced and politicized IRS itself.” 
The Volokh Conspiracy blog on The 
Washington Post carried a somewhat more 
politely worded imprecation to the D.C. 
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Circuit by Jonathan H. Adler, a law 
professor at Case Western Reserve 
University and an architect of the statutory 
strategy. So did the Wall Street Journal’s op 
ed page. All these and others appeared 
within a day of one another. It’s safe to say 
that never has so much (virtual) ink been 
spilled in public over the question of 
whether a federal appeals court should grant 
a rehearing petition. And for this politically 
driven crowd to claim the moral high ground 
in pre-emptively accusing others of playing 
politics borders on fantasy. 
As I said at the beginning of this column, it 
would be funny if it wasn’t so serious. 
 
